Internal and External Context Effects Upon the Types of Information Encoded From Pictures by Penland, James G.
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects
12-1-1979
Internal and External Context Effects Upon the
Types of Information Encoded From Pictures
James G. Penland
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Penland, James G., "Internal and External Context Effects Upon the Types of Information Encoded From Pictures" (1979). Theses and
Dissertations. 2501.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2501
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXT EFFECTS UPON THE TYPES OF 
INFORMATION ENCODED FROM PICTURES
by
James G. Penland
Bachelor of Arts, Metropolitan State College, 1977
A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fu lfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts
Grand Forks, North Dakota
December
1979
Internal and External Context Effects Upon the Types of 
Information Encoded from Pictures
James G. Penland, M.A.
The University of North Dakota, 1979 
Faculty Advisor: Dr. James Antes
Several investigators (e.g., Biederman, et a l . 1974; Loftus &
Bell 1975) have proposed that one's perception and subsequent recogni­
tion of pictured scenes results from the acquisition of two types of 
information. One is specific  in nature and results from the direct 
inspection of object detail. The second type is  more general in char­
acter and is  thought to result from the processing of contextual in ­
formation. Friedman (in press) has pointed out that context must be 
considered to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical) 
constraints, and as such to have a dual informational base. The present 
study was designed to assess the separate and combined effects of these 
internal and external sources of contextual information as they in f lu ­
ence the amount of object detail later available to the observer.
Each of 72 (21 male) undergrads was presented with a written
phrase prior to a 150 msec, exposure of a pictured scene, followed by
a four alternative forced-choice recognition test. Subjects responded
by selecting one of the four objects in the test as having been viewed
previously, and then rated their confidence in that selection. The
type of internal or memorial-based contextual information, prompted
1
by a written phrase describing the theme of each stimulus picture, 
was varied within subjects such that each subject viewed one-third of 
the pictures preceded by a compatible theme, one-third preceded by a 
neutral phrase, and one-third preceded by an incompatible theme.
External context and recognition test distractors were varied between 
subjects. External or physical context was either present or absent, 
and the distractor objects were objects from d iss im ilar scenes, objects 
d iffering from those viewed but from sim ilar scenes, or objects possessing 
the same generic name as the target but d iffering in some physical at­
tribute.
Distractors from different scenes consistently resulted in the best 
recognition performance and the most confidence, with no differences in 
accuracy between the other two d istractor types. Subject confidence was 
a more sensitive measure of distractor effects, as ratings were s i g n i f i ­
cantly higher when distractors were varied from the target in object 
rather than attribute information. Recognition accuracy and confidence 
were also enhanced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the 
stimulus picture, but only when distractor objects were from d iss im ila r 
scenes. A trend was evidenced suggesting that recognition accuracy may 
have been enhanced by the presence of external context when test d is ­
tractors were from d iss im ila r scenes, whereas the absence of context 
may have fac ilita ted  performance when distractors differed from the 
target object only in physical detail.
These findings were interpreted via a consideration of the in f lu ­
ences of the two types of information available in real world scenes 
and of the demands imposed on the subject by the particular task employed 
to study their perception and recognizabi1ity.
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ABSTRACT
Several investigators (e.g., Biederman, et al. 1974; Loftus &
Bell 1975) have proposed that one's perception and subsequent recogni­
tion of pictured scenes results from the acquisition of two types of 
information. One is specific in nature and results from the direct 
inspection of object detail. The second type is  more general in char­
acter and is  thought to result from the processing of contextual in­
formation. Friedman (in press) has pointed out that context must be 
considered to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical) 
constraints, and as such to have a dual informational base. The present 
study was designed to assess the separate and combined effects of these 
internal and external sources of contextual information as they in f lu ­
ence the amount of object detail later available to the observer.
Each of 72 (21 male) undergrads was presented with a written 
phrase prior to a 150 msec, exposure of a pictured scene, followed by 
a four alternative forced-choice recognition test. Subjects responded 
by selecting one of the four objects in the test as having been viewed 
previously, and then rated their confidence in that selection. The 
type of internal or memorial-based contextual information, prompted 
by a written phrase describing the theme of each stimulus picture, 
was varied within subjects such that each subject viewed one-third of 
the pictures preceded by a compatible theme, one-third preceded by a 
neutral phrase, and one-third preceded by an incompatible theme.
External context and recognition test distractors were varied between
ix
subjects. External or physical context was either present or absent, 
and the distractor objects were objects from d iss im ila r scenes, objects 
d iffering from those viewed but from sim ilar scenes, or objects possess­
ing the same generic name as the target but d iffering in some physical 
attribute.
Distractors from different scenes consistently resulted in the 
best recognition performance and the most confidence, with no d if fe r ­
ences in accuracy between the other two distractor types. Subject con­
fidence was a more sensitive measure of distractor effects, as ratings 
were s ign if ican t ly  higher when distractors were varied from the target 
in object rather than attribute information. Recognition accuracy and 
confidence were also enhanced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible 
with the stimulus picture, but only when distractor objects were from 
d iss im ila r scenes. A trend was evidenced suggesting that recognition 
accuracy may have been enhanced by the presence of external context 
when test distractors were from d iss im ila r  scenes, whereas the absence 
of context may have fac ilitated  performance when d istractors differed 
from the target object only in physical detail.
These findings were interpreted via a consideration of the in f lu ­
ences of the two types of information available in real world scenes 
and of the demands imposed on the subject by the particular task employed 
to study their perception and recognizability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The psychology of visual perception has evolved out of the efforts 
of scores of investigators who, over the course of many centuries, have 
tried to understand the ab i l ity  of human beings to v isua lly  experience 
the world. The problem faced by each of these investigators has been 
the veracity of this experience; that is ,  the a b i l ity  of people to per­
ceive the organization and differentiation inherent in the environment, 
often on the basis of l i t t l e  information. During this evolution, much 
of the theoretical work has been founded upon the study of pictures 
and p ictoria l representations. Despite assuming a variety of forms, 
these representations generally result in a veridical experience com­
parable to that resulting from direct visual contact with the world.
An explanation of the nature of this experience, and the structures 
and processes which are responsible for it s  occurrence, continues to 
be the challenge to those psychologists interested in how people per­
ceive pictures.
As the study of picture perception has grown, two major theoreti­
cal frameworks have developed to explain present findings and generate 
questions for the future. Both advance explanations for the a b i l ity  of 
people to perceive the visual environment in general, and both give 
special attention to the perception of it s  surrogates, pictures and 
pictorial representations. (For present purposes, pictures and pic­
torial representations are both included to cover the entire spectrum
1
2of visual surrogates, with pictures referring to h igh -f ide lity  repre­
sentations such as photographs, line drawings, paintings, etc., and 
pictorial representations referring to more abstract and symbolic 
representations as might be exemplified in geometric figures or the 
sign-laden graphics of ancient cultures.) The two theoretical posi­
tions d if fe r  in orientation and focus of study, and with respect to the 
types of processes considered c r it ica l to an understanding of picture 
perception.
The f i r s t  framework employs a "reg istrat ion " approach in it s  
study of visual perception. It s  advocates, J. Gibson (1950, 1966, 
1971), E. Gibson (1969), Kennedy (1974), and in his recent work, Turvey 
(1975, 1977), emphasize the importance of the information inherent in 
the visual environment. J. Gibson (1950, 1966) proposed that objects 
in the environment structure the l igh t they reflect such that informa­
tion concerning the identity, shape, size, color, and position of the 
object, and it s  relationship to other objects, is  conveyed directly 
to the observer. With each glance at the environment, part of this 
available information is  registered by the observer and, over succes­
sive glances, the information from each overlaps to impart the impres­
sion of a stable, so lid , and complete visual world. The perception of 
th is visual world is accomplished by attending to the invariant in for­
mation existent within the variant information that results from suc­
cessive glances at the same environment, thus precluding the necessity 
of assuming any mental structures to integrate the information from 
successive glances (J. Gibson 1966). The observer i s  assigned the 
passive role of registering the information crucial to an accurate
3perception of the environment ( i .e . ,  the invariant information), and 
assumes an active role only in searching the environment for informa­
tion and continuously developing more refined a b i l it ie s  to d iscrim i­
nate^  attend to the most informative environmental stimuli (E. Gibson 
1969). In the sense that the observer simply registers invariant in­
formation, this framework proposes that visual perception is  a direct, 
ordinal process (Turvey 1977).
The registration approach contends that pictures convey the same 
information as the objects and scenes they represent, and are therefore 
perceived in an identical manner . . . the invariant information con­
tained in the representation is  registered over the course of several 
fixations upon the picture (J. Gibson 1971; Kennedy 1974). In addition, 
information is  registered te ll ing  the viewer that his or her perception 
is of a surrogate, thus allowing it s  d ist inction from the direct per­
ception of a real world object or scene.
The second major theoretical framework advances a "construction" 
approach to the study of visual perception. It s  proponents, Hochberg 
(1968, 1970, 1972, 1978), Neisser (1967, 1976), Bruner (1957a, 1957b, 
1960), Gregory (1970), and Vernon (1952, 1955, 1970), emphasize the 
cognitive a c t iv it ie s  of the perceiver and the interaction of these 
ac t iv it ie s  with the visual input from the environment. Based upon the 
notion that visual perception results from the products of looking be­
havior, Hochberg (1972, 1975) proposed that such perception involves 
purposeful, goal-directed behaviors. To accomodate the executive func­
tions necessitated by such behavior, a mental structure is  assumed 
that incorporates various cognitive components and functions actively
4to categorize (Bruner 1957b; Vernon 1970), select (Bruner 1960;
Hochberg 1968, 1978; Neisser 1976), and test (Bruner 1957a; Gregory 
1970; Hochberg 1970) input, and generally to serve the perceiver in 
the process of synthesizing visual information into a viable percep­
tion (Neisser 1967). Thus, in th is framework, the observer is assigned 
an active role identifying and comparing visual input within the con­
text of a memorial network, as well as gathering additional input to 
enhance the comparative process . . .  in short, the role of constructing 
the perception responsible for one's visual experience of the world 
(Vernon 1952, 1955).
The perception of pictures and p ictorial representations results, 
according to Hochberg (1972), from the integration of local features 
obtained from momentary glances and information already contained in 
the schematic map of the observer. The schematic map is the mental 
structure that is actively constructed out of information retained 
(and organized) from past experience and information presently being 
obtained from looking behavior. I t  is  this schema or schematic map 
which functions in an executive capacity (though i t  is  not necessarily 
synonymous with the^  executive) to guide the location of future glances, 
fac ilita te  the encoding of information from the current glance, and 
as the standard or expectancy against which incoming information from 
local features may be tested for conformity (Hochberg 1968, 1972).
A primary difference between the two frameworks outlined is  the 
postulation by the construction model of a dynamic mental structure or 
representation to function as the mediated perception of input from 
the environment; th is  mediated perception is  the perception experienced 
by the observer at a given moment in time. The present study follows
5from this construction approach and assumes the existence of a mental 
representation active in the perception of pictures.
As background, the history of this notion of an active mental 
representation and a representative sample of experimentation on pic­
ture perception which evidences selective attentional patterns con­
s istent with a model of mediated perception will be reviewed. This 
is  followed by the presentation of a contemporary theory of picture 
perception, and subsequent pertinent research on the processes involved. 
The chapter closes by noting the implications of th is theory and re­
search as they relate to the current investigation.
A History of Process Mediation
The idea that visual perception involves some kind of mental 
representation has it s  roots in the early attempts of scholars to 
understand how our perceptions of the world are structured into organized 
and meaningful experiences. Although Locke had emphasized the impor­
tance of experience and Kant had proposed innate categories of under­
standing or pure intu it ions, i t  was not until Helmholtz that a theorist 
effectively and cogently integrated their notions and expounded on the 
influence of an organized recollection of past experience on present 
perception.
In implicating the inferential nature of man, Helmholtz (see 
Boring 1950) suggested that current perceptions result from the or­
ganization of sensory input into familiar categories. This organiza­
tion was seen to reflect the ways in which the regu larit ies of the en­
vironment structure incoming information and allowed the u t i l iza t ion  
of capabilit ies for judgment and inference in the perceptual process.
6Current perception was thus viewed as a combination of representations 
based upon past experience ( i.e .,  fam iliar categories) and present 
sensation; this combination being the result of a complex, integrative, 
and inferential process. A perceptual experience was seen as the con­
clusion of this process, and synonymous with i t  (Pastore 1975).
James (1890) and Titchener (1919) thought perception was the 
product of accrued ideas and images as they interacted with present 
sensation, with the latter theorist emphasizing the importance of an 
integrated context as the basis for the meaningful (as synonymous with 
structure) quality associated with perception. Titchener related 
context to some nebulous mental constellation resulting from this ac­
crual of ideas and images, and thus set the stage for the introduction 
of the construct "schema" to capture the envisioned content and process 
thought necessary for perception.
The term schema was f i r s t  employed in the explanation of percep­
tion by Head in 1920, and has since revolutionized sc ie n t if ic  theorizing 
on perception. (Actually, Kant used schema to denote his concept of 
pure intu itions as they functioned in perception, but clearly his 
usage has l i t t l e  relationship to the meaning given the term by theo­
r is t s  to follow [see Oldfield & Zangwill 1942-3]). Head introduced the 
notion of schema to account for the loss of postural perception suf­
fered following lesions to various parts of the motor cortex. Accord­
ing to Head, this schema existed in the brain as an organized, con­
stantly evolving model or standard against which current postural 
position could be evaluated . . . the resulting evaluation equivalent 
to a conscious perception. Thus, perception was viewed as the con­
clusion of a comparative process, a comparison between past impressions
7and current sensations made possible by the existence of this dynamic 
organization called a schema.
Bartlett (1932) made heavy use of Head's notion as an explanatory 
concept in his c la ss ic  exposition on memorial processes, Remembering.
He substantially  enlarged upon the applications and functions of 
schemata, formally proposing them as influential and ever-present medi­
ators in thinking, remembering, and perceiving. According to Bartlett, 
"'Schema' refers to an active organization of past reactions, or past 
experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well 
adapted organic response" (p. 201, 1932).
His presentation of a mediating representation differed from 
Head's in at least three respects. F irst,  Bartlett emphasized the be­
havioral aspects of schemata, proposing the organization of past reac­
tions rather than past impressions. Second, Head restricted the occur­
rence of schemata to higher (cortica l) levels in the nervous system, 
whereas Bartlett conceptualized their formulation at a ll levels. And 
third, Head frequently used the term "model" in his account in a 
manner suggesting he regarded schemata as s ituation-specific , whereas 
Bartlett placed great emphasis upon the generalized nature of schemata. 
This generalized character was seen to make our current experiences 
prototypical in nature, as opposed to specific (Bartlett 1932). Bart­
lett also went beyond Head in arguing that our constructed percep­
tions incorporate personal interests, values, and needs, and by intro­
ducing the notion of "orientation." Orientation was regarded as one 
of the primary functions of schemata . . .  a function that made certain 
perceptual responses more probable in a given situation, such that
8incoming information is restricted in it s  impact upon the final percep­
tual experience.
, Following Bartlett, numerous investigators (e.g., Ittelson 1954; 
Northway 1940; Wolters 1933) espoused active cognitive mediation of 
visual perception, most employing a schema somewhere within their par­
t icu la r  theoretical framework. Generally, these theorists had l i t t l e  
to add to the construct as conceived by Head and amended by Bartlett. 
There is ,  however, the work of a few investigators that merits discus­
sion for it s  enrichment or new look at the function of a process media­
tor in perception.
An aspect of schema poorly developed by Bartlett is  it s  function 
as a plan for perceptual behavior. I t  was Piaget in his voluminous 
writings on developmental epistomology who f i r s t  emphasized th is  qual­
ity. According to Piaget (1954, 1973), schemata are by nature sensory- 
motor plans, cognitive structures related to classes of action-systems 
relating recurrent situations to a disposition to act. Schemata were 
seen to structure incoming information via the processes of assim ila­
tion, and were modified by accomodating to this information. Thus, 
perception was viewed as the product of th is  ongoing interplay between 
assim ilation and accomodation. The planning character evident in Pia­
get 's  approach embraces the same notion of goal-directed behavior that 
is  later found in the works of M ille r,  Galanter, and Pribram (1960) 
and Hochberg (1972, 1975), a ll of whom emphasized the importance of 
such behavior for perception.
The emphasis upon personal h istory, values, interests, and needs 
as they influence perception was enhanced by the Transactionalists 
and their descendents in the New Look (see Avant & Helson 1973). The
9Transactionalists viewed perception as the product of many transactions 
between the individual and the world . . . transactions giving r ise  to 
assumptions regarding the nature of the world. These assumptions, 
heavily influenced by individual values and interests, are organized 
into a schematic representation of the world that functions to integrate 
current sensations into a meaningful perception. While proposing cog­
n itive  mediation in the form of an "assumptive world," they failed 
to address i t s  nature or the processes responsible for it s  occurrence 
(Pastore 1975). I t  was the work of investigators such as Bruner and 
Vernon that would throw more ligh t on the influence of these idiosyn­
cratic factors in the categorization and integration of sensorial in ­
formation.
Bruner (1951, 1957a) proposed that visual perception results from 
the matching of sensory information about an object to a cognitive 
"category." Stimulus information from the environment functions as a 
cue (see Brunswik 1956) used by the observer to infer category member­
ship. Bruner's categories are analogous to schemata, functioning to 
organize object information within the currently existing network of 
information already present in the observer. These categories serve 
to guide the selection of cues in accordance with currently operating 
hypotheses regarding the nature of the object under consideration.
It  is  the hypothesis of the observer that determines the access ib il­
ity of categories and incorporates ind iv idua ls ' needs, values, and 
personality patterns. Thus, "perception involves an act of categoriza­
tion" (p. 123, Bruner 1957a), followed by the formulation of hypotheses 
used to select more information, and concluding with the confirmation 
of these cues as appropriate to the categorization. Id iosyncratic
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factors function to tune the hypotheses in favor of the individual 
( i .e . ,  make them compatible with both past experience and present needs 
and interests), with the result that perception tends toward the typ i­
cal or expected and may even d istort the true c la ss if ica t ion  of object 
information and result in a non-veridical perception (Bruner 1951).
Vernon (1955) equated assim ilation and schematization as pro­
cesses responsible for the integration and organization of recorded 
sense data into a mental representation or set of expectations.
Schemata were seen to function in perception to produce a condition of 
expectation such that the observer knows what to look for in the in­
coming flood of sensory data and how to handle these data . . „ "how 
to c la ss ify ,  understand, and name them, and draw from them inferences 
that give meaning to percepts" (p. 186, Vernon 1955). The construction 
of schemata, like the formulation of Bruner's hypotheses, reflect the 
different experiences of different individuals, and the interests that 
led them to seek these experiences. She viewed the influence of 
idiosyncratic factors as both indirect and enduring in their effect 
upon selecting and c la ss ify ing  information.
U t i l iz in g  the hypothesis-testing approach of Bruner, Neisser 
(1967) proposed that perception is  the end result of a preliminary 
analysis of the visual f ie ld  followed by an active synthesis of in fo r­
mation from those objects attended plus information retained from 
previous acts of attention. This constructive act of synthesis thus 
re lies heavily upon both memorial and attentive processes. The entire 
perceptual process is thought to be cyclical in nature, whereby a 
schema of the present environment functions to direct exploration for
11
information, resulting in the sampling of specific  environmental in for­
mation which, in turn, modifies the schema of the present environment 
. . . and so on (Neisser 1976). According to Neisser, the schema 
represents only one part of the observer's "cognitive map" (Tolman 
1948) or "v isual world" (J. Gibson 1950) and is thus narrower in scope 
than either. To the extent that i t  directs exploration i t  is termed an 
anticipatory schema (see Woodworth 1938), and to the extent that i t  
exists in a modified form, relative to it s  form in previous phases of 
the cycle, i t  may be called an orienting schema. However conceived, 
the schema is seen basically as a plan of action for selecting, analyz­
ing, and interpreting information received from the environment such 
that a meaningful perceptual experience results.
A quite current approach to process mediation in visual percep­
tion is  based on the concept of "frames" introduced by Minsky (1975).
A frame is  sim ilar to a schema in that i t  may be viewed as a gener­
alized representation of the information acquired from past experiences 
relating to a given situation. A frame exists as a h ierarchically 
organized network of nodes and relations, the top levels of which are 
fixed and represent general information always true about a particu­
lar situation. Information at these upper levels of the network may 
be thought of as defin itive with respect to the particular scene or 
object that the frame represents. The lower levels of the network 
function as terminals or "pigeon-holes" (Broadbent 1971) ready to ac­
cept specific detailed information gathered from the observer's cur­
rent interaction with a particular situation. Prior to or in the 
absence of detailed input, default information ( i.e .,  prototypical
12
knowledge based upon the aggregate of past experiences the observer has 
had with that situation [see Evans 1967]) occupies these terminals and 
can be used to f i l l  or read in missing data (Minsky 1975). Related 
frames may themselves be organized into a network or frame system, also 
thought to be hierarchically organized (see Palmer 1977 for a discussion 
of hierarchical organization in visual perception).
Frames may be seen to d iffe r  from schemata in that they tend to 
be essentia lly  sta t ic  in character, existent as an outline waiting to 
be completed by sensory information. Perception consists of the activa­
tion of a frame and/or it s  corresponding frame system by the presence 
of sensory data or by the preparatory act iv it ie s  of the perceiver in 
anticipation of sense data (Friedman, in press).
Applying the concept of an active mental representation to the 
study of visual perception, Hochberg's theorizing has incorporated most, 
i f  not a l l ,  of the theoretical work on schema since it s  conception, 
making his theory useful to consider as a summary to th is h istorica l 
presentation.
Hochberg (1975) asserts that the postulation of a schema or 
schematic map as a theoretical construct is necessary to account for the 
integration of information obtained from successive glances at the 
visual f ie ld  because such glances may be separated by considerable 
time and space, and because some kind of selection occurs during the 
interval between glances. He proposed that schematic maps have the 
following functions: (a) expectancy generalization, (b) information 
generalization, (c) feature storage, and (d) peripheral selection of 
new information (Hochberg 1968). Schema thus serve to guide eye
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fixations via expectancies and peripheral selection,encode information 
obtained during the course of a fixation using the prototypical informa­
tion held in a schematicized deep structure, and store the encoded in­
formation against which to compare new information for recognition and 
as a basis for a judgment about where to locate the next fixation. The 
generalized or prototypical nature of information stored in the schema­
t ic  map is viewed by Hochberg as the reason the perceiver can go beyond 
the information given and generate information consistent with past ex­
perience and enduring d ispositions. In emphasizing the purposeful qual­
ity of the looking behavior that ultimately results in a visual percep­
tion, Hochberg (1970) refers to schematic maps as "perceptuo-motor 
analogs" generated by the perceiver and used to extract and edit the , 
most useful information from that available so that the experience is  an 
organized and meaningful one. Coming to a meaningful experience is 
accomplished through the integration of successive samples of environ­
mental information and is most eff ic ient when the selection of information 
to be sampled is consistent with the currently operating schematic map. 
Therefore, schemata become a primary determinant of the allocation of 
attentional effort.
In concluding this review of the h istorica l development of the 
concept of mental structures or schemata as active mediators in visual 
perception, i t  is  important to note that there has been no attempt to 
discuss those theories (e.g., Hebb 1949; Koffka 1935; and in some res­
pects Neisser 1967) which suppose mental representations or images pos­
sessing a one-to-one correspondence with the object or scene they rep­
resent (see Anderson 1978; Pylyshyn 1973; Sloman 1971 for such a discus­
sion). The structure generally and variously referred to as a schema,
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schematic map, or frame is presumed here to have no such correspondence 
( i.e .,  i t  is propositional rather than analogical in character— see 
Palmer 1975b; Winston 1975).
For the most part, present usage of the concept of a mental repre­
sentation entails a synthesis of Hochberg's and Minsky 's descriptions, 
combining the emphasis of the former on process and the focus of the 
latter upon structure. This representation is assumed to be the con­
struction of the observer bu ilt  from various sources of information and 
functioning as a continually active process in the selection of in fo r­
mation and in the modification of it s  own form. It  is this representa­
tion that is  perceived and is  synonymous with one's perception at any 
given moment.
For c la r i t y 's  sake, the term schema will be used in the remainder 
of th is report whenever possible. However, the reader should remain 
alert to the subtle differences in meaning that have been ascribed to 
different terms used to construe mental representations involved in 
visual perception, and know that such differences may influence one's 
thinking appreciably.
Looking at Pictures
It  is important to examine, at least in a representative fashion, 
prior studies conducted on attentional patterns in the perception of 
pictures and pictoria l representations for at least two reasons. F irst, 
these studies provide evidence that the object of attention at any 
given moment is not the result of some random process, but rather re­
flects systematic and directed behavior, and thereby implicate the 
presence of some organizing and guiding structure at work during the
/perceptual process. And secondly, i t  is  a reasonable assumption that 
the information extracted from a p ictoria l stimulus is  highly corre­
lated with the focus of attention ( i .e .,  we extract more information 
about those objects and scenes to which we attend than about those to 
which we don't attend). Therefore, an examination of attentional pat­
terns of subjects confronted with p ictoria l stimuli not only supports 
the notion of an active mental representation, but also y ie lds great 
insight into the kind of information encoded by the observer and ava il­
able for later use.
To address the question of attention allocation when viewing 
pictures, one may begin with the f i r s t  systematic study of how people 
look at pictures. In 1935, Buswell used corneal reflection techniques 
and movie camera recordings to determine the eye movements of adults 
as they viewed numerous pieces of c lass ica l art. He discovered that 
two basic patterns of looking occurred: the f i r s t  was described as a 
general survey of the picture marked by a series of short pauses over 
the major portions of the picture, followed by a detailed study of the 
picture involving long fixations concentrated over small areas of the 
picture. Buswell also noted that the duration of eye fixations in ­
creased as subjects continued to view the picture, suggesting that 
they were spending more time processing the detail of the picture as 
viewing progressed.
More recently, Yarbus (1967) found that people tend to direct 
their attention to the most informative aspects of a picture. Under 
free-viewing conditions subjects would fixate the eyes, nose and mouth 
of a face and would direct their gaze toward people rather than
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/inanimate objects. Subjects also tended to fixate contours and other 
physical aspects of the picture l ike ly  to inform them of it s  content. 
Further, Yarbus found that subjects' pattern of eye movements exhibited 
a noticeable degree of repetitiveness over the course of viewing, with 
later fixations re-examining portions of the picture fixated earlier 
(see also Noton & Stark 1971).
Under more precise conditions, Mackworth and Morandi (1967) em­
ployed a free-viewing paradigm where the subjects scanned a picture for 
10 sec. The major difference between their procedure and that used by 
Yarbus was that pictures were divided into 64 sections and each section 
was subjectively rated for recognizabi1ity  and informativeness without 
the raters viewing the intact picture. Mackworth and Morandi found that 
the location and density of eye fixations of a different group of sub­
jects viewing the entire picture were highly related to these ratings, 
with high informative sections receiving the most fixations and the 
longest duration. Analysis of each 2 sec interval showed that the den­
s ity  of fixations did not change with time, a pattern inconsistent with 
that found by Buswell (1935). Because their subjects immediately 
fixated informative (unpredictable) aspects of the picture, Mackworth 
and Morandi suggested that subjects might use information gathered 
peripherally to locate future glances.
A study by Antes (1974) further explored this tendency of ind i­
viduals to focus upon the informative parts of a picture. Using stimuli 
divided into meaningful sections and subjectively rated for their 
informativeness, an independent group of subjects viewed 10 pictures 
taken from the Thematic Apperception Test for 20 sec under free-viewing
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conditions. He found that the density and duration of fixations, as 
well as the extent of saccades, were not consistent throughout the view­
ing period. Over the course of viewing the picture, subjects in i t ia l l y  
fixated for short periods of time on highly informative areas of the 
picture and gradually shifted to a looking response where fewer sac- 
cades (longer durations) were made and fixations were directed at the 
lesser informative picture parts. Consistent with the findings of 
Buswell (1935) two d ist inct patterns of viewing were evidenced. The 
in i t ia l  and immediate attention to informative picture sections in 
th is  study provided further support for the notion of some extrafoveal 
mechanism guiding fixation location, and subsequently the extraction of 
information.
The controlled attentional response evidenced in the studies above 
is  also found under task-imposed conditions. Yarbus (1967) had sub­
jects view pictures under s ix  different sets of instructions (e.g., 
evaluate the economic status of the family pictured), and noted that 
the density and duration of fixations was greatest on those aspects of 
the picture log ica lly  most informative with regard to the question 
posed by the experimenter (e.g., furniture, clothing, and other material 
possessions).
During a visual search task an ind iv idua l 's  fixation and duration 
patterns are influenced by a number of variables. Gould (1967; Gould 
& D ill  1969; Gould & Peeples 1970) conducted a series of experiments 
where subjects were shown a nonsense pattern (the standard) in the middle 
of a display and were required to find it s  match among numerous pat­
terns located in the periphery. Results revealed that increasing the 
s im ila r ity  of target and non-target patterns lead to more and longer
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fixations, and that increasing the number of target elements had the 
same effect. I t  might be concluded that the degree of d if f icu lty  in a 
discrimination task is  related to the probability of attention being 
directed to areas most helpful for the ta sk 's  completion. Relevant 
also is  the evidence that peripheral information is active in the de­
termination of fixation location.
In another study of search times, Pollack and Spence (1968) in ­
vestigated the impact of informativeness upon locating a targeted sec­
tion from a picture. Five pictures were divided into 70 sections and 
rated on a 12-point scale for informativeness in terms of the impor­
tance of the section to the overall meaning of the picture. Assuming 
attention is  necessary for rapid search, they found the pictures rated 
most informative to be discovered more rapidly than those rated least 
informative in all three search conditions they employed. Along with 
making fewer errors, these faster search times for highly informative 
traget sections provide additional support that attention is  attracted 
by the most informative areas of the picture f i r s t .
The rated informativeness of picture sections as an intervening 
variable in recognition and localization tasks has also been studied. 
Antes (1977) divided color pictures into eight sections and had subjects 
rate the sections as either high or low in informational value with 
respect to the overall meaning of the scene. Using an independent group 
of subjects, he found that both recognition and localization accuracy 
depended upon the rated informativeness of the section probed and it s  
location relative to the center of the picture. High informative and 
centrally located sections were more accurately recognized and located
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than low informative and peripherally located sections, with the effects 
of informativeness and location apparently independent.
Metzger (unpublished doctoral d issertation, 1976) also employed 
color pictures divided into eight sections, but sections were rated as 
high, medium, or low informative. Like Antes (1977), Metzger found that 
recognition depended upon the rated informativeness of the target sec­
tion and it s  location in the picture. In addition, he found that in­
formativeness and location interacted, with medium informative picture 
sections better recognized at peripheral locations while highly in fo r­
mative sections were more accurately recognized when they were cen­
t ra l ly  located.
Two recent studies have addressed the nature of informativeness 
in pictures. Taken together they provide support for the idea that 
the constitution of informativeness, and therefore a primary determi­
nant of attentional allocation, involves both physical and cognitive 
components.
Antes and Stone (1975) employed a multidimensional s im ila r ity  
analysis of 10 judges' ratings of informativeness for a single stimu­
lus picture divided into 32 sections. That analysis revealed that 
ratings of high-informativeness were primarily based upon the presence 
of identificable features or detail in the rated section, and the 
meaningfulness of these features or objects in terms of the meaning of 
the intact stimulus picture. That readily identif iab le objects define 
highly informative picture sections has been confirmed in a study by 
Antes, Singsaas, and Metzger (1978).
Examining the determinants of eye fixations during picture view­
ing, Loftus and Mackworth (1978) differentiated between what they
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termed "physical" and "semantic" factors in characterizing informative­
ness. Cognitively, an object is  informative to the extent that the ob­
ject has a "low a priori probability of being in the picture given the 
rest of the picture and the subject 's past h istory" (p. 104). Physically, 
an object is informative to the extent that i t  is non-redundant in an 
information-theoretic sense (see Berlyne 1960; Garner 1962). Subjects 
were shown 78 pictures for 4 sec with one-half of the pictures contain­
ing a cognitively informative object (e.g., a tractor in an underwater 
scene) and the other half containing an uninformative object (e.g., 
the same tractor in a farm scene). Results showed that subjects fixated 
earlie r, more often, and for longer durations on the informative ob­
jects. In addition, the extent of eye movements to informative objects 
was re lative ly  long (7 degrees), again suggestive of a peripheral ed it­
ing process functioning to guide fixations to informative parts of the 
picture Such a process is  sim ilar to that proposed by Mackworth and 
Morandi (1967) but is seen as dependent upon cognitive rather than 
physical features.
As noted at the outset, this presentation was intended to be 
representative rather than exhaustive. Numerous additional studies 
(e.g., Berlyne 1960; Day 1964; Mackworth & Bruner 1970; Williams 1966) 
could be cited that have investigated the variables that influence the 
allocation of attentional effort when viewing p ictoria l stimuli.
Excellent reviews have been compiled by Rayner (1978) and Kahneman 
(1973). I t  might also be noted that a review by Wachtel (1967) details 
the influence of the observer's "sty le  of approach" to pictured in for­
mation, a notion which reflects the intensive (Berlyne 1960; Hochberg 
1972) rather than selective character of looking behavior.
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The studies reviewed in this section convincingly demonstrate 
that the sampling of pictured information is indeed controlled and not 
random. Under both task-imposed and free-viewing conditions, people 
look in i t ia l l y  to the most informative areas of a picture. Most prob­
ably, such direction and control is the product of an active mental 
representation of the picture enhanced by information gathered from 
both foveal and peripheral vision. As viewing continues, lesser in fo r­
mative picture parts of the picture are examined and processed.
Regarding the information extracted as a result of such looking 
behavior, i t  may be inferred from the two d ist inct patterns evidenced 
in the work of Buswell (1935) and Antes (1974) that more than one type 
of information is being gathered. In addition to the detailed informa­
tion gathered during each fixation on the picture, the in i t ia l  broad 
sweeps across the picture with short fixations would present the ob­
server with a diverse sample of the p ictu re 's  content, and give the 
observer more general or global information about the picture. This 
idea of two kinds of information extracted during the perception of 
pictures has recently been developed into a general theory of picture 
perception, and is  the topic of the next section.
A Duplex Theory of Picture Perception
As noted by Hochberg (1968, 1970), the postulation of some or­
ganizational structure is necessitated by the purposeful, goal-directed 
nature of our attentional response. In addition, the influences of 
past experience and momentary task demands require that such a struc­
ture be amenable to change while maintaining it s  identity. C la ss ica lly ,  
these requirements have been met by the construct "schema." As
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evidenced in the previous section, attentional patterns in picture per­
ception also reveal this controlled and task-directed se lect iv ity ,  and 
would thus also imply the existence and functioning of a schema.
A general theory of picture perception has recently been advanced 
that incorporates this idea of a schema. The theory is  founded p r i­
marily in the empirical work of investigators interested in the effects 
of context on the perception of pictures, the most notable of which is  
Biederman. It  was Biederman (1972) who f i r s t  proposed that two types 
of information are active in the perception of pictures, but the ante­
cedents to th is notion are easily  recognized. As reviewed earlie r, 
Buswell (1935) identified what he thought to be two attentional pat­
terns in his subjects' responses to c lass ica l art, and suggested that 
the long fixations over small areas of the pictures were indicative of 
the viewer processing detailed information about it s  content. The 
results of several studies (e.g., Hochberg 1968; Mackworth & Morandi 
1967) support the operation of some kind of peripheral editing process 
prior to the focusing of foveal attention, and presumably based upon 
information different in character from that gathered foveally.
Further, Karpov, Luria, and Yarbus (1968) remarked on the presence of 
what seemed to be two d ist inct processes of information encoding from 
their research with brain lesion patients. And, the d ist inct ion  by 
Neisser (1967) between pre-attentional perceptual processes and pro­
cesses involving perceptual synthesis suggest the processing of two 
types of information in the perception of pictures. This research 
notwithstanding, Biederman's research is the proper start ing point for 
what might be termed a "duplex" theory of picture perception.
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Because of the empirical genesis of th is theory, Biederman's re­
search will be presented f i r s t ,  followed by a summary describing the 
characteristics of the theory. Refinements and supporting evidence w ill 
conclude this section.
In his 1972 study, Biederman's subjects viewed 96 real-world 
scenes and were asked to identify which of several objects was in a cued 
position within the scene. He varied exposure duration (300, 500, and 
700 msec), cueing order (before and after stimulus presentation), and 
whether the scenes were presented in a coherent or jumbled state. Jumb­
ling  was employed to remove the effects of context by destroying the 
information derivable from given spatial relationships among objects, 
and was accomplished by cutting each picture into s ix  parts, rearrang­
ing them, and photographing them for presentation. In addition, Bieder- 
man presented the four response alternatives either before or after 
the presentation of the stimulus. As expected, recognition accuracy 
was best at a ll durations when the cue and response alternatives were 
presented beforehand and the scenes had been viewed in a coherent 
state. More importantly, he found a s ign if icant reduction in recogni­
tion accuracy when scenes were jumbled, even when subjects knew what 
to look for (alternatives before) and where (cue before).
These jumbling effects led Biederman to propose the existence of 
two "functional units" (corresponding to information types) involved in 
the perception of a scene . . . one based on individual objects, and 
the other a more global schematic type. In addition, he raised the 
question of the location of context effects, which he supposed corres­
ponded to schematic information, in the processing sequence.
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To examine further the impact of context on the perception of 
pictures, Biederman, Glass, and Stacy (1973) studied the effects of ob­
ject probability and coherency on a speeded search task. Again, real- 
world scenes were employed so that the meaningfulness normally encoun­
tered would be maintained in the experimental setting. Before viewing 
the scene for 5 sec in either jumbled or coherent form, subjects viewed 
an object which they were told might be in the scene they were about 
to see. When presented with the scene they were to press either a "yes" 
or "no" finger key to indicate whether the object they had seen before­
hand was contained in the scene. On one-third of the t r ia ls  the object 
was from the scene. On another third of the t r ia l s  the object was not 
in the scene but possibly could have been (e.g., an automobile followed 
by a street scene). On the last third, objects were not contained in 
the scene and their inclusion was very improbable given the meaning of 
the scene (e.g., an automobile presented before a kitchen scene).
Consistent with the 1972 study, jumbled stimuli required longer 
response times than coherent scenes, with the difference being most 
pronounced when the response category was "possible no." Biederman, 
et al. interpreted their results in terms of a schema model of proces­
sing, whereby an in it ia l  ho l is t ic  or semantic interpretation is con­
structed followed by a more detailed analysis. Reaction times were 
slowest under the jumbled "possible  no" condition because the in i t ia l  
h o l is t ic  characterization, once achieved, did not allow the irmiedi- 
ate recognition that the target object probably was not contained in 
the scene presented. The effect of jumbling in the "impossible no" 
condition was to require additional time for the construction of this
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overall, semantic interpretation before detailed analysis and compari­
son of the target object with those held in memory could be accom­
plished. Formation of this h o l is t ic  characterization, though delayed, 
would be su ff ic ient for rejection of the targeted object in this condi­
tion, and thus response times were faster for "impossible no" when 
compared to "possible  no."
Important to the discussion of later studies, Biederman, et al. 
(1973) also noted that these effects may have resulted from some in­
terference with the object identification process. And, by proposing 
that a ho lis t ic  characterization is dependent upon a physical context, 
and that contextual information is the f i r s t  to be extracted from a 
pictured scene, these authors suggest that the effect of context in the 
processing sequence is  primary, and thus answer the question posed in 
1972.
In a third study, Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass, and Stacy (1974) 
limited the exposure duration of the stimulus picture to a maximum of 
300 msec so that the information extracted must result from a single 
eye fixation, and studied the ab il ity  of subjects to select from among 
two verbal labels the one that accurately represented the theme of a 
p ic to r ia l ly  presented scene. The stimuli used in the previous studies 
were again used, as was jumbling because of the belief that the theme 
of a scene i s  dependent upon the spatial relations among objects within 
it.
In the f i r s t  experiment reported, they studied the effects of 
jumbling upon scene characterization. Jumbling was hypothesized to 
reduce subjects' conceptual accuracy (labeling) when labels were
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sim ilar ( i.e .,  where objects would be of less informational value). 
Scenes were presented for 20, 50, 100, and 300 msec. Jumbling, label 
s im ila r ity ,  and duration were a ll s ign if icant, as was the duration by 
label s im ila r ity  interaction. The correct label was selected most often 
when labels were d iss im ila r  and when scenes were presented coherently.
In addition, these effects reached an asymptote by 100 msec, producing 
a ce il ing  effect probably responsible for the single s ign if icant  inter­
action.
In the second experiment reported, the 1972 study was replicated 
except that durations were now 20, 50, 100, an 300 msec, and half of 
the subjects made selections from verbal response alternatives rather 
than p ictoria l ones. Scene version and duration were s ign if icant  as 
was their interaction, with coherent scenes resulting in a higher per­
centage of correct object identif ications at a ll durations, but with 
the difference in performance on coherent versus jumbled forms less 
pronounced at the longer durations. This improvement of the jumbled 
condition with increased exposure evidenced the impact of spec if ic  ob­
ject information in overcoming the interference effects of jumbling 
as viewing progressed.
Again c it ing  a schema model of processing, Biedernian, et al. 
summarized their 1974 findings as reflecting the extraction of two 
kinds of information simultaneously. As specific  object information 
is sampled from a scene, a ho i is t ic  characterization including a thematic 
component is constructed. Both specific  information and the more glo­
bal information of the ho l is t ic  schematic representation are available 
after brie f 100 msec exposures, and each may be evidenced under the 
appropriate task conditions.
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Taken together, Biederman's three studies demonstrate that the ef­
fect of a coherent context ( i.e .,  the natural spatial relationships among 
objects, and the relationship between objects and the scene in which 
they are embedded) on recognizing objects from a scene is  a fa c i l ita t ive  
one. Facilitation  is  greatest when the scene is viewed for a very brief 
time. And further, a coherent context helps the observer to semantically 
label the scene.
It  is appropriate at this point to clearly describe the theory of 
picture perception which has emerged from Biederman's work. Basically, 
i t  is  proposed that two d ist inct types of information are available to 
the observer when viewing a picture. The f i r s t  type may be characterized 
as detail or specific  object information, probably acquired from foveal or 
near-foveal vision. The second type of information is  more global or gen­
eral in nature, and is probably founded upon information gathered both 
foveally and peripherally. That is ,  this global characterization of the 
scene is constructed out of information concerning the identity and spa­
t ia l relationship of the scene's content.
The construction aspects of this theory are of paramount importance 
because the perceiver 's realization ( i.e .,  awareness) and use of global 
information is  made possible by the existence of a schematic representa­
tion of the scene constructed out of contextual and specific  object in­
formation, and tempered with the knowledge gained from past visual ex­
periences with such scenes and held in memory. I f  th is schematic repre­
sentation is considered to be hierarchical and pyramid-like in structure 
(see below) then general information about a scene is  most probably held 
in the upper or higher levels of this representation. It  is  further as­
sumed that one's global interpretation of a scene contains a semantic
component.
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Both types of information about the pictured scene are acquired 
simultaneously. However, because there are innumerable pieces of de­
tailed information potentially available in any given scene, the com­
plete processing ( i.e .,  extraction, encoding, storage, etc.) of this 
information type may begin simultaneously with the extraction of global 
information but w ill take considerably longer. Therefore, when a 
scene is viewed for a very brief period of time contextual information 
is the major informational source for the completion of most tasks. 
Further, when context is jumbled or absent, the extraction of global 
information in the form of a h o l is t ic  characterization or scheme is 
interfered with, and the construction must then be based solely upon 
detail or specific  object information as a result. With prolonged view­
ing, perception is  based more upon the increasing amount of detail in ­
formation being acquired. It  might also be inferred that this detail is 
incorporated into the schematic representation of the scene so that 
after prolonged viewing one's mental representation, and thus one's 
perception, includes both a global understanding of the scene and an 
accurate l i s t  of it s  specific  detail. This theory may be termed a 
"duplex" theory of picture perception because the information synony­
mous with a perception is  of two types and is acquired simultaneously.
A theoretical work by Palmer (1975b) describes a possible struc­
ture for scene schema and in the process addresses how the global in­
formation is integrated and interacts with the detailed information 
gathered from a scene. According to Palmer, a schema may be described 
structurally  as a set of relationships between various informational 
entit ie s,  with sets of information organized hierarchically. These 
entities contain sense data concerning the physical properties of
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objects at the lower levels, and exist as object schemata at higher 
levels. A scene is  thus represented structurally  by the relationship 
among various object schemata. Objects are represented structurally  
as a set of physical properties (e.g., size, color, orientation) occur­
ring in a certain relation to one another. Applied to the duplex 
theory of picture perception, global information or a h o l is t ic  charac­
terization of a scene is analogous to that information contained at 
the upper levels of a scene schema. Detail information about an object 
is represented as one of a collection of values involved in the charac­
terization of the object.
Noting that recognition is fac ilita ted  by a coherent context and 
when the stimulus is well known rather than novel, Palmer asserts that 
one's knowledge gained from past experience enters into the perceptual 
process in the form of a propositional schema as described above.
The observer enters a scene with certain schemata primed to characterize 
that scene. The schema tentatively selected to fac ilita te  the scene's 
interpretation is determined by the in i t ia l  input from the gaze of the 
observer in the form of contextual information. Detail information is 
incorporated into the lower levels of whatever conceptual interpretation 
has been adopted. In this manner both types of information are pro­
cessed simultaneously. When contextual information is  not available, 
the selection of a conceptual interpretation is delayed and requires 
the tr ia l  and error processing of considerably more detail before 
one's final perceptual interpretation of the scene i s  possible. When 
a conceptual interpretation has been adopted, whether tentatively or 
otherwise, i t  causes the observer to seek or expect confirming sense
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data. Contrary data may be misinterpreted or cause a different concep­
tual interpretation (schema) to be adopted which is  more consistent with 
the current input. Palmer's (1975b) structural and process analysis 
reflects the interaction between global and detail information which is 
of primary import in understanding the perception of scenes.
In addition to the research by Biederman (1972; Biederman, et al. 
1973; Biederman, et a l . 1974) presented above, support for the duplex 
theory of picture perception in the form of evidence for the existence 
and activ ity  of a h o l is t ic  characterization has come from a variety of 
studies.
Potter (1975) tested the notion that the meaning of a pictured 
scene is  extracted very early in the viewing process. She presented 
subjects with either a target picture or a name for the target picture 
and then gave them a recognition test. Names given the target scenes 
were brief descriptions of the major objects or events pictured (e.g., 
a boat). During the test phase, pictures (the target and 15 distrac- 
tors) were exposed for 125, 167, 250, or 333 msec. Potter reasoned 
that to rapidly detect a target defined by it s  meaning rather than a 
specific  visual pattern, the subject would have to semantically iden­
t i fy  the target scene as i t  was presented during the test phase. Her 
results showed that subjects were able to recognize a target scene as 
rapidly and accurately when they knew only it s  name as when they had 
viewed that scene in advance. This finding held even at the shortest 
exposure duration employed (125 msec). As predicted by the duplex 
theory of information extraction, a pictured scene is rapidly processed 
to an abstract level of meaning.
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In a 1977 report, Biederman explored the semantic and syntactic 
properties of schemata in their influence upon scene recognition. Not­
ing that schemata are effective within the f i r s t  100 msec of viewing a 
scene, he developed a technique to violate specific  relations between 
an object and the scene within which i t  is  embedded. The five relations 
studied were support, interposition, probability, position, and size.
As the f i r s t  two embody physical restra ints on object-scene relation­
ships, they were considered syntactic components. Probability, posi­
tion, and size reflect referential meaning, and were thus referred to 
as semantic components.
Employing line drawings of scenes on acetate, 247 scenes were 
composed with the necessary vio lations and xeroxed for presentation. 
Scenes were presented for 150 msec followed by a cued object, and recog­
nition was tested. In looking at the error rates, targets v io lating 
a relation were less accurately identified (yielding miss rates of 
45% compared to 25% for target pictures with no v io lations in rela­
t ions), and there was a tendency for misses to increase when several 
vio lations were included. There were no s ign if icant differences in 
the error rates for v io lations in syntactic as compared to semantic 
relations. In the violation detection task reported, the cue preceded 
the scenes and subjects were required to press either a "v io lat ion " 
or "no v io lation" key. Again, there was no difference between v io la ­
tions detected based upon the type of vio lation, but as the number of 
v io lations increased from one to three, the speed of detection also 
increased. In a third task reported, subjects were to respond when 
they detected a specified vio lation. In th is task, reaction times
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were slowed when an irrelevant violation was included, also suggestive 
of the s im ila r ity  of vio lation types.
Citing the duplex model, Biederman interpreted his results as 
reflecting the operation of a scene schema immediately upon the pre­
sentation of the picture. As the schema is in i t i a l l y  constructed from 
the information gathered from a single fixation and primarily based 
upon the contextual information available, violation of th is context 
via the destruction of specific  relations also destroys or inh ib its 
the proper functioning of the schema. Object identif ication is made 
more d if f ic u lt  (in terms of both time and accuracy) and the recognition 
or detection of a given vio lation is confused. Additionally, the v io la ­
tion identif ication task demonstrates that knowledge of physical or 
syntactic relations does not precede or succeed knowledge of referen­
t ia l or semantic relations . . . rather, both types of relations are 
active in the construction of a ho l is t ic  characterization of the scene.
The Loftus and Mackworth (1978) study cited in the previous sec­
tion also supports the idea that contextual information and it s  re­
sultant h o l is t ic  characterization is available to the observer early 
in the processing of pictures. Their subjects fixated immediately 
upon what they termed "informative" objects. As noted, what defined 
an object as informative was the context of the picture and the sub­
je c t 's  past history. Therefore, for subjects in their study to se­
lect informative over uninformative objects for the focus of atten­
tion required that those subjects immediately process contextual in ­
formation and form a ho l is t ic  characterization of the scene. Loftus 
and Mackworth suggested that this process allows the observer to
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assimilate these improbable objects as part of the currently viewed 
scene with the scene schema carried into the situation remaining other­
wise unaltered. After the f i r s t  fixation when the ho lis t ic  characteri­
zation is  f i r s t  generated, a comparative process begins whereby schema 
generated expectancies are tested against incoming sense data. This 
process occupies the remainder of the observer's picture processing 
time.
Support for the functioning of a ho lis t ic  characterization in 
picture perception may also be found in Antes (1977) investigation of 
recognition and localization accuracy in two experiments. In both 
experiments photographs were divided into eight sections and rated by 
an independent group of subjects for their informativeness ( i.e .,  the 
amount of information the section contained relative to the entire 
p ictu re).
In the f i r s t  experiment, pictures were presented for 100 msec 
followed by one of the sections serving as a probe or target, and sub­
jects were to decide i f  the probe section had been part of the stimu­
lus picture and assign confidence ratings to their decisions. Probe sec­
tions rated as highly informative were better recognized than those 
rated low informative, and sections occupying a central position in the 
stimulus picture were also better recognized. Using a signal 
detection analysis of errors i t  was discovered that low informative 
probes yielded more fa lse alarms and high informative sections yielded 
more misses. Assuming fewer identif iab le objects in the low in fo r­
mative sections (Antes & Stone 1975), i t  was probably necessary 
for subjects probed with these sections to rely upon whatever schema 
might have been derived from the contextual information in a single
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glance, and thus subjects would be more l ike ly  to respond posit ive ly 
when there was no match between probe section and picture. However, 
when sections were high in informativeness, and thus contained identi­
fiable objects, such confusions were less l ike ly ,  and negative responses 
when there was a match dominated. This interpretation is entirely 
consistent with the duplex model, and further suggests that the sub­
je c t 's  schema or h o l is t ic  characterization of the scene w ill be auto­
matic in it s  effect upon recognition responses, u t i l iz in g  whatever in­
formation is available ( i .e .,  i t  is  not a voluntary process that is  
engaged only when suff ic ient information exists to avoid most error).
In the second study reported, subjects were shown the stimulus 
picture for either 100 or 500 msec followed by a probe of one of the 
sections. Subjects were to indicate on a 2 x 4 grid where in the pic­
ture the probe section had been located. Both high informative and 
centrally located sections were better localized. While correct 
responses were made only 31% (100 msec) and 38% (500 msec) of the time, 
incorrect responses were often made to adjacent grid areas suggesting 
that the general location of the section had indeed been determined.
As subjects tend to fixate the highly informative sections of the pic­
ture f i r s t ,  this overall poor localization accuracy prompted Antes to 
speculate that the underlying processes responsible for recognition 
accuracy and localization may be different. I t  seems plausible that 
detail information greatly enhances recognition performance but only 
ind irectly aids the localization of an object by in it ia t in g  or ac­
tivating a schema of the scene. The spatial information necessary 
to localize objects is tied to th is schematization which functions
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primarily on past experience in early viewing and u t il ize s  contextual 
information as viewing progresses* Until the schema has had time to 
evolve and gather this external spatial information, loca lizab i1ity re­
mains at a low level compared to recognizability.
Loftus and Bell (1975) designed a study to investigate the extent 
to which picture recognition is based upon specific  versus global in­
formation. Subjects were shown 60 pictures followed by 120 pictures 
(including the orig inal 60) as part of a yes-no recognition task. The 
pictures were either photographs, embellished line drawings, or un- 
embellished line drawings. Five exposure durations were employed: 60, 
100, 250, 350, and 500 msec. The relevant findings were that both the 
amount of detail contained in the picture and the exposure duration 
were s ign if icant in their effects upon recognition. Accuracy improved 
with increased viewing time, and photographs were better recognized 
than embellished line drawings, and these better recognized than unem- 
bellished line drawings. These findings were bolstered by consistent 
confidence rankings and subjective reports. Subjects were more confi­
dent when more detail was available, and reported more often that 
their recognition judgments had been based upon specific  detail rather 
than on feelings of fam iliarity.
Loftus and Bell proposed that the additional detail afforded the 
observer in the richer (defined in an informational sense) stimuli 
provided a better opportunity to encode a specific  detail, with the 
result of such encoding being a "quantuum leap" in the available glo­
bal information. This is consistent with the duplex model which pro­
poses that recognition w ill be best under conditions where both
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specif ic  and contextual information are available. While i t  might seem 
reasonable to expect that i f  recognition of b rie fly  presented scenes is 
based predominantly on global information then accuracy should be 
equivalent among the three types of stimuli used in this experiment 
since all afforded global information, the obtained results appear even 
more reasonable when i t  is  remembered that both specific  and global in ­
formation are available to the observer arid incorporated into the schema 
representing a scene. The scene having the most evolved or embellished 
schema w ill be more accurately recognized than one containing fewer 
spec if ics, therefore the better recognition of photographs in the Lof- 
tus and Bell study. The important contribution here is  the emphasis 
upon specific  information in the processing of pictures . . .  an em­
phasis which is not at the expense of the part played by more global 
information in that same processing.
The interactive nature of specific  and contextual information in 
the recognition of pictures was also evidenced in the study of Metz­
ger (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1976) cited earlier. His finding 
that medium informative sections of pictures were better recognized 
than high informative sections could be predicted on the basis of the 
content of medium informative sections. These sections contained 
both specific  object information and contextual information, and as 
such contributed more to the scene schema than high informative sec­
tions where only specif ic  information was available.
Support for and refinements of the duplex theory of picture per­
ception may also be found in the study of context, which evidences 
the impact of contextual information in the formation of a ho lis t ic
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characterization of scenes necessary for their interpretation and per­
ception. As the current investigation is  i t s e l f  primarily concerned 
with the study of context, an examination of these studies w ill be pre­
sented separately in the next section.
In concluding this section, i t  might be noted that the present 
study adheres to the duplex theory as set forth above. When an ob­
server is  confronted with a scene, both specific  and global informa­
tion are available and are active in creating his or her perceptual 
experience. As indicated in th is and the previous section, detailed 
information is acquired through the process of foveal sampling of the 
scene's highly informative sections (and medium informative sections to 
the extent that they contain readily identifiable objects). Global 
information is gathered primarily from the context of the scene via 
peripheral sampling of both medium and low informative areas, but is 
also based upon the results of comparative operations which have occurred 
previously and involve the relational characteristics of objects and 
scenes. These two types of information interact with each other over 
the course of viewing and perceiving the scene. In it ia l  viewing ac­
tivates a comparison between expectations held in a schematically 
structured memory and those acquired from contextual information with 
incoming detail information. The outcome of this comparison process 
entails that future scans of the scene be directed to areas that 
might confirm these expectations or resolve any conflicts between ex­
pectations and input. As in the cyclical processing advocated by 
Neisser (1976) and Hochberg (1970, 1978), the specific  information 
gathered from these discrete searches w ill modify the scene's concep­
tualization, leading to altered expectations, altering the outcome of
various comparisons, and ultimately changing the conceptualization of 
the scene synonymous with it s  perception.
Contexts Effects in Picture Perception
What are the effects of contextual information on the perception 
of a scene and the objects embedded within i t ?  Despite the efforts of 
many investigators, this question remains largely unanswered. What is  
known concerning context effects in the perception of pictures has 
emerged primarily from the work of Biederman (1972, 1977; Biederman, 
Glass, & Stacy 1973; Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass & Stacy 1974) and 
others to be presented in this section who have studied the perception 
of pictures d irectly ( i .e . ,  have used pictures as stimuli). However, 
relevant findings have also come from investigators employing non­
p ictoria l stimuli (e.g., words, geometric configurations) and deserve 
mention here.
A pioneering study into the effects of context on the recogni­
tion of words was conducted by Tulving and Gold (1963). A total of 
three experiments were reported, a ll stemming from the basic premise 
that the amount of stimulus information required by a subject to recog­
nize a word varies inversely with the amount of contextual informa­
tion provided. In the f i r s t  experiment, context length (8, 4, 2, 1, 
or 0 words preceding the target word) and the congruity of context 
(incongruous contexts were incompatible with the target word) were 
examined. An example of Tulving and Gold's stimuli is  the following: 
"Three people were k il led  today in a terrib le  highway COLLISION"
(p. 321), where the word in uppercase letters served as the target. 
Using the target word "RASPBERRY" within that sentence would
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constitute an example of an incongruous context. Ten target words were 
tested under the various combinations resulting from the two variables, 
and length of tachistoscopic exposure necessary for a veridical report 
of the target word was the dependent variable.
Results clearly showed that increasing the length of congruous 
context fac il ita te s  word recognition, whereas increasing the length of 
incongruous context interferes with recognition. Experiments 2 and 3 
demonstrated a strong monotonic relationship between contextual in fo r­
mation and length of context, and between congruity and length of con­
text. In addition, they established that the dominant relationship 
was between context congruity and context length. I t  was therefore 
concluded that i t  is  not the amount of contextual information but it s  
relevance that accounts for the effects of context on word recognition. 
These results also clearly implicate contextual information in the 
activation of expectancies or hypotheses about the nature of the 
specif ic  stimuli being observed.
In a study designed primarily to examine the issue of seria l 
versus parallel processing (see Estes & Taylor 1966; Sperling 1967) 
Reicher (1969) measured recognition performance for one or two le t­
ters, four-letter words, and four-letter non-words. After tachisto- 
scopic presentation of the stimulus followed by a 100 msec masking 
fie ld , each subject was required to select the letter they had seen 
in the stimulus presentation from a pair of letters (all letters in 
the alphabet were sampled). In addition to stimulus type, Reicher 
varied exposure duration (6Q, 75, and 90 percent performance levels for 
a given individual) and cue presentation (response alternatives were 
presented either before or after stimulus presentation).
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The major findings were that performance on one word was better 
than performance on either one letter or one quadrigram, and that per­
formance on two words was superior to that on either two letters or 
two quadrigrams. This trend was unaltered by presenting the alterna­
tives beforehand or by increasing the exposure duration. In addition, 
confidence rankings by the subjects were consistent with these find­
ings; subjects were more confident on words than on the other types of 
material. This "word superiority effect" provides obvious support 
for the notion that information is  processed in parallel. I t  also 
suggests that what is  extracted from the stimulus presentation is  the 
meaning of the stimulus, with the conceptualization faster for words 
than for letters alone or for quadrigrams in Reicher's study.
In 1972, Wheeler conducted a study that paralleled in essential 
detail of design the study of Reicher (1969). The major difference 
in paradigm consisted of the addition of several controls in the ma­
terial used as stimuli (e.g., positional cerainty, testing of letters 
that also function as words in the English language). The persistence 
of the word superiority effect was evidenced, as Wheeler obtained re­
su lts identical to Reicher's, and to a greater degree, 10% compared to 
87o superiority of words over letters and quadrigrams.
Wheeler suggested that the recognition of words cannot be accom­
plished via independent letter recognition processes; rather, there 
must exist an interaction among the letters of a word such that a con­
text results. It  is not a contextual noise or narrowing effect, as 
poor performance on the quadrigrams indicated, but the context as 
meaningful information relevant to it s  constituent parts that i s
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fa c i l ita t ive  in the recognition task. Additionally, Wheeler proposed 
that his results are amenable to a simultaneous constraints model of 
processing, which he described as an in i t ia l  parallel feature extrac­
tion stage followed by a second stage based on information gathered 
during the f i r s t  and functioning to locate, construct and encode the 
stimulus. The consistency of this proposal with the duplex theory 
cited earlie r  is  evident.
An investigation conducted by Weisstein and Harris (1974) ex­
amined the a b i l i ty  to recognize line segments embedded in various types 
of context. Four line segments d iffering in orientation and location 
within the visual f ie ld  were presented at one of three exposure dura­
tions ranging from 5 to 44 msec. For a given t r ia l ,  one of these lines 
was shown together with one of s ix  contextual patterns. The subject 's 
task was to view the stimulus (followed by a 100 msec mask) and iden­
t i f y  which of the line segments had been presented.
The main finding was that when a line segment was part of a con­
figuration (context) that appeared unitary and three-dimensional i t  
was better recognized than when presented within a f la t ,  non-meaningful 
pattern configuration. Weisstein and Harris suggested that th is result 
with non-verbal stimuli is  analogous to the word superiority effect 
found by Reicher (1969) and may be viewed as evidence for the efficacy 
of contextual information, especially meaningful contextual information, 
in the rapid perception of stimuli that are more spatial in nature than 
words or letters.
In a series of five experiments, Pomerantz, Sager, and Stoever 
(1977) investigated what they termed the "configural superiority ef­
fect." This effect is analogous to the word superiority effect, but
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arises when stimuli are geometric configurations rather than letters or 
words. In a ll the experiments reported, line segments of d iffering 
orientations, lengths, positions, and curvatures were used as stimuli.
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with either a single 
parenthesis (no context condition) or a pair of parentheses (context 
condition) for 200 msec. When presented as a pair, only one parenthesis 
served as the target. The targets were varied to face either le ft  or 
right (open or closed position), and the subject had to make a forced 
choice as to the direction of the target. Analysis of reaction times 
showed a s ign if icant  difference, with times for the context condition 
being the fastest.
In the second experiment, Pomerantz, et al. minimized memorial 
involvement by presenting subjects with an array of 16 stimuli, four 
of which were different from the remaining 12, and required subjects 
to indicate the location of the disparate quadrant in the array. Ad­
d it iona lly ,  this experiment controlled for the symmetry, spacing, and 
mirror-imageness of the stimuli. Results indicated that the configural 
superiority effect persisted with the additional controls. Also, i t  
was found that arrays containing additional irrelevant contextual in ­
formation led to poorer performance. Thus contextual information may 
fac ilita te  or inh ib it  the speed of localization depending upon its 
relevance.
In the third experiment reported, the discriminations involved 
were of a broader ecological sample (e.g., orientation of curved line 
segments, position of a line relative to a fixed point, line length), 
and arrays were reduced in size from 16 to 4 elements so that ind i­
vidual elements or features might be enlarged (display size was kept
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constant). Analysis of reaction time measures showed that some of the 
discriminations were faster when made under context conditions, while 
others were slower.
In Experiment 4, subjects did not know in advance of presentation 
whether they would be viewing the stimulus in context or without.
Stimuli were two arrays from Experiment 3, one with context and one with­
out. Again, the configural superiority effect was evidenced and d is ­
criminations were faster under context conditions.
The last experiment Pomerantz, et all. reported was concerned with 
the seria l versus parallel nature of processing from geometric configura­
tions. Subjects were required to determine whether there were any d is ­
parate elements embedded in an array ( i .e „ , a visual search task), 
under no context, good context (highly d ist inct and identif iab le con­
textual elements), or poor context (vague and complex contextual ele­
ments) conditions. Array size (2, 4, or 6 elements), presence or ab­
sence of d isparity, and location of d isparity within the array were 
also varied. These la st  two variables were for control purposes only 
and were not analyzed. Reaction times were best for good context, 
followed by no context, and larger arrays were responded to more slowly. 
These findings were confounded by the interaction between the two var i­
ables and further analysis revealed that array size affected only the 
detection of stimuli embedded in poor contextual arrangements. Further, 
no configural superiority effect was obtained when the good contextual 
arrays were compared to those without context. However, Pomerantz, 
et a l . proposed that this last finding may have indeed reflected a 
context effect in that the arrays without context, when taken as a
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whole, tended to form schematicized representations of letters of the 
alphabet, and were probably responded to as such. I t  was thus suggested 
that parallel processing had been evidenced.
The major conclusions to be drawn from the work of Pomerantz, 
et al. (1977) i s  that context improves d iscrim inability  under certain 
conditions and, on the basis of the oddity and search tasks which 
minimized the influence of memory, context has its  effect on the per­
ceptual rather than the post-perceptual processing of geometric con­
figurations. The authors proposed an emergent-features explanation of 
the effects of context on perception, suggesting that the emergent 
features are more novel than the elementary features, and are thus 
more discriminable than features presented as targets without context. 
The inconsistent effect of context in these studies i s  probably due 
to the fa ilure  of a recognizable emergent feature to result from every 
contextual arrangement. Translated into the terms of the duplex 
theory, not every contextual arrangement results in the activation of 
a familiar conceptualization; the more foreign the contextual and 
specific  information, the more active construction necessitated at 
the time of viewing for a coherent and meaningful experience to re­
su lt. In proposing these emergent features in the perception of a 
superordinate spatial configuration, Pomerantz, et al. imply a direct 
perceptual access to this higher order information, a notion entirely 
consistent with the duplex theory presented earlier.
From these experiments employing non-pictorial stimuli, i t  is 
evident that contextual information plays an important role in the 
perception of a broad range of stimuli as measured by a variety of 
tasks. And while th is  review has not been an exhaustive one, the
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results of the studies presented here indicate that information derived 
from the context of a stimulus can either fa c i l ita te  or inh ib it  perfor­
mance on a task depending upon it s  relevance and meaning. Taken as a 
whole, these studies suggest that a higher order conceptualization of 
the stimulus may be derived primarily from the contextual information 
at hand, and that such context is  an active informational source in 
the total processing sequence. Consistent evidence has come from 
studies employing pictures (e.g., photographs, line drawings) as stimul
In 1975 (a), Palmer investigated the effects of context on the 
recognition of objects from line  drawings of scenes. Subjects were 
f i r s t  shown a s lide  containing a contextual scene or a blank for 2 
sec. Following a 1300 msec delay they were shown a second slide  con­
taining the target object for a duration of 20, 40, 60, or 120 msec. 
Subjects were to respond by writing the name of the object perceived, 
and to assign a confidence ranking to their judgment. For the f i r s t  
s lide  viewed, context was either absent, appropriate, or inappropriate. 
Within the inapporpriate context condition there were two subcondi­
tions: one where the following target object was sim ilar in shape 
and size to an object appropriate to that scene, and one where i t  was 
d iss im ila r along these dimensions.
The principal finding was that accuracy of recognition was 
highest when the target was preceded by an appropriate context, less 
so when preceded by a blank s l ide , and poorest when i t  followed an 
inappropriate context. Furthermore, performance in the "inappropriate 
context— sim ilar target" condition was in fe r io r  to that in the "inappro 
priate context— d iss im ila r  target" condition. Increased exposure dura­
tion also enhanced performance. These findings evidence the importance 
of both contextual information and specific  physical characteristics
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as they influence a subject 's response. When subjects had contextual 
information with which to conceptualize object information they were 
better able to recognize or recall objects than i f  no contextual informa­
tion was available. I f  inappropriate to that in which the object is 
normally encountered, that same contextual information may result in 
an incorrect characterization and thereby give r ise  to a non-veridical 
response. The incorrect characterization of an object is more l ike ly  
when it  physically resembles an object appropriate to another concep­
tualization, invoked here by an inappropriate context. That the in- 
appropriate-dissimilar target condition resulted in better performance 
demonstrates that the conceptualization of an object is based upon 
physical or specific  detail as well as upon context. The improved per­
formance with increased exposure represents the impact of an increasing 
store of specific  information about the object with longer viewing.
A study reported by Antes and Metzger (in press) looked at the 
effects of context upon the recognition and localization of objects in 
pictures. Two experiments were reported, the f i r s t  being an extension 
of the works of Biederman (1972) and Palmer (1975a).
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with 100 msec displays 
of either line drawings containing s ix  objects embedded in the context 
of a scene, or drawings of those same objects in an array without the 
background context. This allowed for the reduction of context (rather 
than disrupting i t  as Biederman had done) and the presentation of con­
textual and object information within the same exposure (improving 
upon Palmer's design). Stimulus construction also allowed the objects 
in the array to maintain the same spatial relationships as they had in 
their contextual presentation. Following the stimulus presentation,
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subjects were required to select the object that they had seen in the 
display in a four alternative forced-choice recognition task. The a l ­
ternatives were either consistent or inconsistent with the context of 
the scene in which the target object was embedded. Location of target 
objects within the display was controlled for by randomly assigning 
near and far objects from each stimulus to two t r ia l  series.
Antes and Metzger found that target objects were selected from 
inconsistent response alternatives most accurately and that target ob­
jects near the center of the display were recognized better than those 
located in the periphery. Analysis of the interaction between context 
and distractor consistency revealed that recognition was most accurate 
when objects were presented in context and the distractors were in ­
consistent with that context. Context also interacted with location, 
showing that objects presented without background context were recog­
nized better i f  they were located in the central portions of the display. 
Antes and Metzger proposed that these findings demonstrate that context 
does not simply improve recognition for embedded objects; rather, it  
allows subjects to bias their responses in favor of objects appropriate 
to the scene. Context thus functions primarily to enhance the general 
characterization of the scene and fac i l ita te s  object recognition only 
ind irectly via inferential processes u t i l iz in g  information contained 
in that characterization. Their results further indicate that con­
textual information is  not the major informational source for the recog­
nition of centrally presented objects.
In the second experiment reported, the effect of context on the 
ab i l ity  to localize objects was investigated. The stimuli and their 
presentation was identical to that in Experiment 1. The task of the
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subject was to locate a cut-out of the target object within a frame 
equated in size to the stimulus display in the same position i t  occu­
pied in the stimulus presentation. Analyzing the difference between 
the subject 's positioning of the target object and it s  true location, 
and the difference between the distance of the target from the p icture 's 
center and the distance of the subject’s positioning and center, they 
found that context was a s ign if icant factor . . . subjects in the con­
text condition were better able to accurately localize the objects.
The true location of the target object (central versus peripheral) also 
had an effect, with subjects placing near objects further from the cen­
ter of the picture than they truly were, and inversely placing peri­
pherally located objects closer to the center.
Antes and Metzger concluded that context fac il ita te s  the location 
of objects by providing information used to construct a representation 
of the scene which serves as a "frame of reference" for the spatial 
orientation of objects.
A study conducted by Antes, Penland and Metzger (manuscript in 
preparation) compared the effects of context on the recognition of both 
usual and unusual objects presented in pictures. For comparative pur­
poses, the conditions of Antes and Metzger (in press) were replicated, 
except the target objects were now inappropriate to the context in 
which they were embedded. The subject 's task was to identify the tar­
get object from among four response alternatives that were either con­
sistent or inconsistent with the context of the picture. Because of 
the unusual character of the target objects, none of the objects a va il­
able for selection in the inconsistent distractor condition were related 
to the context of the picture. To the extent that contextual
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information is  u til ized  in the recognition of objects, th is condition 
was expected to y ie ld  the poorest performance. Preliminary analysis 
showed that unusual objects were more poorly recognized when presented 
in context than when presented without background context. As expected, 
unusual objects were recognized at chance levels when subjects were 
tested under the inconsistent distractor condition. However, poorest 
performance resulted when the distractors were consistent with the con­
text of the picture; a result consistent with the suggestion of Antes 
and Metzger (in press) that contextual information may bias responses 
in addition to altering the subject 's perception and conceptualization.
Subjecting the combined results of this task and those of Antes 
and Metzger's f i r s t  experiment to analysis revealed that object usual­
ness interacted with both picture context and distractor consistency.
The recognition of both usual and unusual objects was approximately 
equal in the no context condition, whereas the recognition of usual 
objects was s ign if ican t ly  above chance in the context condition and 
the recognition of unusual objects was s ign if icant ly  below chance in 
the context condition. These findings clearly demonstrate that the 
a b i l i ty  to recognize an object is  fac ilitated  by contextual information 
i f  derived from an appropriate context and inhibited by information 
gathered from an inappropriate or atypical context. Antes, Penland, 
and Metzger (manuscript in preparation) suggest that contextual in fo r­
mation is  active during both the encoding and response periods in a 
study such as this one, affecting the encoding of specific  object in ­
formation such that only usual objects are encoded, and a ltering the 
subject 's response such that i t  is directed toward objects consistent 
with the context of the picture.
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Mandler and her colleagues have conducted a series of studies 
(Mandler & Parker 1976; Mandler & Johnson 1976; Mandler & Ritchey 1977) 
investigating the effects of context on the recognition of various 
types of p ictoria l information. Mandler and Parker (1976) presented 
four scenes ( line  drawings) which were either organized (objects were 
in their normal spatial relationship to each other and horizon markings 
were evident) or unorganized (essentia lly  jumbled with horizon markings 
absent). Subjects viewed the pictures for 20 sec each with a 10 sec 
interval between pictures. They were then given an immediate recogni­
tion test followed by a localization task with the objects selected in 
the recognition task being given to the subject to locate within a 
frame. Mandler and Parker varied the size, orientation, and appearance 
of the pictured objects to y ie ld  an eight alternative forced-choice 
recognition test for each of the objects in each of the pictures.
None of the three variations employed resulted in differential 
performance on the recognition test for organized versus unorganized 
scenes. Apparently the context of the picture had l i t t l e  effect on 
such descriptive information. Analysis did reveal that picture organi­
zation had a s ign if icant  effect upon localization performance; objects 
in organized pictures were localized more accurately than those viewed 
in unorganized pictures. Mandler and Parker's findings suggest that 
contextual information is more important to the spatial representation 
of objects than for their subsequent recognition. Keeping in mind the 
20 sec exposure duration used in this study, such a finding would be 
expected given the amount of time available to gather specif ic  object 
information. Both detail and more global information would be
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available in su ff ic ient quantity after 20 sec and the former would be 
a far more accurate source for making the discrimination required in 
the recognition task, whereas the latter would be more useful in the 
localization task, probably because localiz ing  an object within a 
scene requires some rudimentary characterization of the scene as a 
whole (in the relationships among objects in the scene, including their 
spatial relationship), and this is precisely the character of global 
information.
Also in 1976, Mandler and Johnson employed a same-different 
recognition task in the comparison of organized versus unorganized pic­
tures, and their effects upon the type of information encoded. Their 
stimuli were 10 line drawings of scenes presented for either 5, 20, or 
60 sec (held constant for a given subject). The alternatives in the 
recognition task were pictures identical to those used as stimuli, but 
having undergone one of five transformations: an object was moved, 
two objects in the picture exchanged places, an object was deleted, an 
object was replaced by another object of the same size and shape but 
conceptually different, or an object was replaced with an object of 
the same conceptual class but different in size and shape.
After converting their data to signal detection measures, Mandler 
and Johnson found that h it  rates varied s ign if ican t ly  for exposure 
duration only, with longer presentations resulting in higher h it rates. 
Analysis of correct rejections revealed more correct rejections for 
organized scene versions when two objects had been exchanged, and for 
unorganized versions when an object was moved or deleted. The other 
two transformations employed had no effect upon correct rejections when
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comparing organized versus unorganized presentations. As with h its, 
correct rejections increased at longer exposure times. Analysis of 
response latency revealed that all responses were more rapid to organized 
versus unorganized pictures with 5 sec exposure, whereas responses were 
slower for organized pictures for durations of 20 and 60 sec.
From the signal detection analysis comes evidence that context 
may be used primarily in the rejection of incorrect alternatives, 
rather than as a basis for a direct identifying response. This log ica lly  
follows from the contention that contextual information tends to be 
global in character and, therefore, w ill not be useful to the observer 
in discriminating detail but w ill allow gross discrimination of the 
kind necessary to reject incorrect alternatives. As noted, hits did 
increase s ign if ican t ly  with increased exposure duration, demonstrating 
the impact of an ever-increasing pool of detail or specific  informa­
tion. The effect of context in detecting exchanges between objects 
suggests that i t  plays a more important role in spatia lly  representing 
objects in the scene, while the meaningful quality associated with the 
characterization presumably derived from contextual information inh ib its 
the detection of changes in object density within the picture. The 
varying effects of scene organization in combination with exposure dura­
tion is more d if f ic u l t  to account for. At the 5 sec duration, the 
expected advantage of context i s  evidenced, while at longer durations 
latencies for the no context conditions were shorter. Handler and 
Johnson suggest that detections were made equally fast at a ll exposure 
durations, but that during the longer exposures subjects spent more 
time exploring organized pictures subsequent to the detection than 
they would spend exploring pictures without context.
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Mandler and Ritchey (1977) presented their subjects with eight 
slides of either organized or unorganized pictures for 10 sec each. 
After viewing all eight s lides, they were to respond by making a same- 
different judgment and assign a confidence ranking to their decision. 
Recognition tests were given immediately, one day later, one week 
later, and after one month's time, however only the immediate recogni­
tion test is  pertinent to th is discussion. Eight different transfor­
mations and substitutions were made on the pictures used as distractors 
in the same-different recognition test. The relevant finding is  that 
picture organization had a dramatic effect upon responses requiring 
information about the spatial location of objects. This finding is  
consistent with those of the earlie r  Mandler studies (Mandler & Parker 
1976; Mandler & Johnson 1976) and with the results of Antes and Metzger 
(in press) in showing that contextual information is  heavily involved 
in representing the location of objects within a scene.
The studies presented thus far lead to several conclusions regard­
ing the effects of context on the perception of pictured information. 
When l i t t le  specific  object information is  available ( i .e .,  when p ic ­
tures are viewed for a very brief time or during the in i t ia l  viewing 
of a picture for a prolonged time) the information derived from the 
context of a scene i s  the primary basis for an observer’s response to 
questions concerning the scene's content. I f  an unusual or unexpected 
object is  placed in the scene it s  recognition under these circumstances 
is  unlikely, especially i f  i t  is  s im ilar in size and shape to objects 
normally occupying that position in the scene. With prolonged viewing, 
the increasing store of detail information is relied upon to answer
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questions about specific  object information, and with this as the basis 
for a response, unusual objects are quickly recognized. Viewing time 
does not affect the impact of contextual information as it  affects 
responses to questions regarding the location of objects within the 
scene to this extent. Both in i t ia l l y  and with prolonged viewing, con­
text is the foundation for a spatial representation of the location 
of objects embedded in a pictured scene. As the contextual information 
available to the observer also increases with increased exposure, this 
spatial representation becomes more accurate with time but context re­
mains i t s  major informational source.
In a somewhat different approach to the study of context, Fried­
man (in press) has invoked the notion of "frames" to account for the 
processing of scene information. Noting that context must be considered 
to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical) constraints, 
she argued that picture perception is  most probably a "top-down" af­
fa i r  ( i .e .,  acquisition of information from the environment in accor­
dance with some internally held conceptualization or hypothesis) when 
the object of the process is  fam iliar or expected in relation to its  
context, and that i t  is the result of an interaction of top-down and 
"bottom-up" ( i.e .,  the acquisition of environmental information in 
accordance with the constraints inherent in the environment i t s e l f  
without prejudice from any conceptualization held by the observer) 
processing when the object is  unfamiliar or unexpected. (See Lindsay 
& Norman, 1977 for a discussion of data- and conceptually-driven pro­
cessing in perception.) Further, she proposed that objects may be 
c la ss if ied  with respect to a given context. An "obligatory" object
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is  one that is closely related to the theme or meaning of a scene 
(e.g., a refrigerator in a kitchen scene), and it  functions to activate 
or instantiate the frame that represents that scene (in this instance, 
a kitchen frame). A "nonobligatory" object is one that is not directly 
related to the meaning of a scene (e.g., a pot of geraniums in a 
kitchen), but is not atypical or unexpected in that context. Nonobliga- 
tory objects are not su ff ic ient to instantiate a scene's frame represen­
tation.
Both obligatory and nonobligatory objects are properly c la ss if ied  
as arguments (informational units) for a given frame, and both types of 
objects may be inferred or activated by default in the absence of sense 
data to the contrary. Friedman proposed that because obligatory ob­
jects are diagnostic regarding the frames for which they are an argu­
ment, they should be processed in a top-down fashion. Nonobligatory 
objects w ill reflect a more interactive processing because they are not 
defin itive with respect to the scene of which they are a part. D if­
ferentiating obligatory and nonobligatory objects from "unexpected" 
ones, she suggested that the latter represents a "wierd" element and 
is processed by being attached to, but not integrated with, the scene's 
frame. Typical objects y ie ld  object frames that easily  coalesce to 
form larger, more global frame systems which represent the scene, 
whereas existing unexpected or atypical objects, and their corresponding 
object frames, remain differentiated. Consequently, the level of detail 
available to an observer w ill be far greater for objects that are un­
expected and whose frames are not arguments of the scene frame. 
Theoretically then, transformations on objects (e.g., Handler & Johnson
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1976) should have different effects on recognition performance depend­
ing upon whether they are made on obligatory, nonobligatory, or unex­
pected objects.
Friedman (in press) tested this hypothesis by presenting subjects 
with s ix  embellished (25-35 objects per picture) line drawings of real- 
world scenes for 30 sec each. The topic or theme of each picture was 
announced verbally to the subject prior to it s  presentation, and eye 
movements were recorded while subjects scanned the scenes. After view­
ing the entire stimulus set, subjects were given a two-alternative 
forced-choice recogntiion test. Every object in each of the s ix  p ic­
tures was rated independently for it s  likelihood of occurrence within 
the picture, with high, medium, and low ratings corresponding to obliga­
tory, nonobligatory, and unexpected objects, respectively. Type 
changes ( i .e . ,  replacing an object with another of the same size and 
shape but conceptually different), token changes ( i.e .,  replacing an 
object with an object of the same conceptual class but different in 
size and shape), deleting an object, and exchanging the position of 
two objects within a picture were the four transformations carried out 
upon objects in the pictures used as distractors in the recognition 
test. Additionally, the type changes were made on objects that were 
rated either high, medium, or low in terms of likelihood of occurrence.
Analysis of mean fixation duration (which Friedman assumed cor­
responded to the time taken to encode an object) across subjects re­
vealed that 28% to 52% of the variation was accounted for by an object's 
rated probability of occurrence, when considering f i r s t  fixation.
L ike !  ihood accounted f o r  between 14% and 38% on the second f i x a t i o n ,
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and between 6% and 24% on subsequent fixations (pooled). Examining 
f i r s t ,  second, and third fixations as they interacted with likelihood, 
Friedman found that high and medium objects were consistently viewed 
for shorter times than low objects, with the difference decreasing from 
342 msec on the f i r s t  fixation to 73 msec on the third. Analysis of 
the proportion of times a distractor was correctly rejected given that 
the object transformed had been fixated showed that distractors were 
correctly rejected most often when the change involved an object with 
a low probability of occurrence, least often when the rated object was 
highly probable, with objects rated medium in likelihood intermediate 
between the other two. It  was also found that the three type transfor­
mations and the deletion transformation were recognized a s ign if icant  
proportion of the time, while token and object exchange transforma­
tions were poorly detected and were within the range of chance. Fin­
a lly ,  the effects of transformation type and likelihood of occurrence 
were apparently independent.
Granting Friedman's assumption that there is a correspondence 
between fixation duration and rate of encoding, the finding that the 
duration of the f i r s t  fixation was a function of the a priori l i k e l i ­
hood that the fixated object would be present in that particular scene 
is  strong support for the hypothesis that obligatory, nonobligatory, 
and unexpected objects may be differentiated according to the degree 
of bottom-up processing evoked. As predicted, subjects rarely noticed 
changes to expected objects but almost always noted transformations to 
unexpected ones. This would indicate that the frame or schematic 
representation of the scene, including any important variations on
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it s  theme, was the basis for the subjects' recognition responses. 
Friedman asserted that providing the subject with knowledge of the gen­
eral context of what would be viewed via a verbal prompt allowed the 
thus invoked frame structure to aid in the detection of expected ob­
jects and resulted in shorter processing times for these objects. Not­
ing that unexpected objects are more d if f ic u lt  to comprehend ( i.e .,  
harder and more time consuming to encode perceptually) but easier to 
remember because of their differentiated representation, she concluded 
that the recognition of a pictured object involves the process of re­
membering typical or prototypical instances, afforded by the instantia­
tion of a frame for the scene in which the object is embedded, and 
that confusions occur (resulting in poor recognition performance) when 
the task employs distractors that correspond to that frame's default 
information.
The research reviewed in this section provide clear evidence 
that contextual information is  influential in the processes of perceiv­
ing and responding to p ictorial information. Further, these studies 
demonstrate, in accordance with the duplex theory of picture percep­
tion, that the effects of this information are most pronounced when 
the picture is  viewed for a re lative ly  brie f period. With prolonged 
viewing, the increase in detail or specific  object information makes 
i t  probable that the nodes or arguments of the scene's schematic 
representation w ill become occupied by current input, with the result 
that any recognition judgment made at this time w ill be based upon 
actual rather than default information. A helpful d ist inct ion  in 
understanding the role of contextual information in picture perception
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is  that offered by Friedman (in press) between context as pre-existing 
knowledge structures and context as a set of environmental constraints 
present in the stimulus picture. The current investigation pursues this 
d ist inction, and the resultant effects, further.
Overview and Statement of the Problem
For the purpose of the present investigation, i t  is argued that 
the tenets of the duplex theory of picture processing, as proposed by 
Biedernan and supplemented and amended by subsequent theory and invest i­
gation, are essentia lly  correct. An individual possesses a set of 
stored knowledge structures, termed schemata or frames, which contain 
prototypical information about a given object or scene based on past 
experience. The arguments of object frames represent attribute in for­
mation, and their particular structural arrangement captures the unique 
relations among attributes that co llective ly  combine to result in the 
identity of that object. Object frames are themselves arguments of 
more global scene frames, and the network composed by their given 
architecture is synonymous with the identity of the given scene.
Typically, when an individual observes a particular scene these 
a priori structures are at work before the in i t ia l  input is  received. 
This occurs because the current position of the observer in the visual 
world is known to him or her, and this knowledge activates a related 
set of scene frames and their corresponding expectations. This set 
of a priori schemata or frames is  what is meant by internal context.
As information is extracted from the physical surround of the object 
array via peripheral systems, its  processing enriches and completes 
the schema for that scene. The extraction and processing of specific
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information concerning objects from the fovea! system also functions to 
enhance these global structures, but primarily by the direct enhance­
ment of object frames. Thus, an observer enters a situation with a 
schema activated via knowledge of the visual world, and extracts con­
textual information from the environment to further differentiate a par­
t icu la r scene. The contextual information extracted from the physical 
environment of the object array may be referred to as external context. 
The schema for the scene serves to guide the extraction and interpreta­
tion of specific  information gathered from the object array of the scene.
Because both internal and external sources of contextual informa­
tion function to activate scene frames, i t  seems a reasonable assump­
tion that their effects are additive. That is ,  when a scene's frame 
is  activated prior to viewing the scene and is then embellished via in­
formation from the environmental context of the scene, subsequent ob­
ject information should be extracted and processed more e fic iently  and 
accurately than when either one source of contextual information is  
present in iso lation. Recognition of objects interpreted from th is dual 
contextual base should be best under conditions where the alternative 
choices for recognition are objects which are arguments for d iss im ila r  
scene frames. When alternatives are arguments of the same scene as the 
target, enhancement of the recognition process should s t i l l  occur, 
but in lesser degree, as the subject must spend less time processing 
the meaningful nature of the global scene, and therefore may more fu lly  
and rapidly process information about the particular arguments of the 
scene. The effects of the jo int operation of both context sources 
should be least pronounced when alternatives in a recogntion test 
represent variations in attribute frame arguments.
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The current study investigated the relationship between internal 
and external contexts as they interact with the type of information en­
coded from real world pictures. Subjects were shown line drawings of 
arrays of objects for 15Q msec. These objects were presented either 
without background context or embedded in the context of a scene appro­
priate to those objects. Immediately prior to viewing the objects, sub­
jects were v isua lly  exposed to the words "NO PHRASE HERE" (representing 
the no internal context condition), a two or three word label corres­
ponding to the topic or meaning of the scene (representing the appropri­
ate internal context condition), or to a label inappropriate to the 
topic of that scene (representing the inappropriate internal context 
condition). Thus, scene frames were activated prior to the stimulus 
presentation in two conditions, but in one that frame was inappropriate 
to the scene presented. A four alternative forced-choice recognition 
test was administered after each stimulus was presented. The three 
d istractor items for a given set of stimulus objects were d iss im ila r  to 
the target objects in either scene, object, or attribute information.
A basic assumption of this study, and one supported by previous re­
search (e.g., Loftus & Mackworth 1978), is  that the u t il iza t ion  of 
contextual information in the recognition of objects is automatic, and 
not under subject control.
It  was hypothesized that subjects would be most accurate in the 
object recognition task when both internal and external sources of 
contextual information were available, providing that information was 
appropriate to the scene from which the objects would typ ica lly  come. 
When one type of contextual information was not available, i t  was
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expected that subjects would perform less well, and when available con­
textual information was either conflicting or inappropriate, i t  was 
expected that subjects would perform at chance levels only. Regarding 
the types of information varied in the response alternatives and their 
effects given the proposed contextual manipulations, i t  was hypothesized 
that variations in scene and object information would show the greatest 
effects, and that the manipulation of attribute information would be in­
dependent of contextual manipulations.
CHAPTER I I
METHODOLOGY
Design
The problem under investigation required that three variables re­
ceive attention: the physical context within which stimulus objects 
were presented, the type of information varied in the d istractor a l ­
ternatives, and the existence and compatibility (relative to the physi­
cal context) of a pre-stimulus prompt. Physical context was either 
present or absent. The alternatives from which the target object was 
selected differed from the target object along one of three dimensions: 
(a) alternatives were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes, (b) alternatives 
were different objects but from sim ilar scenes, and (c) alternatives 
were the same objects but d iffering in some physical attribute. Con­
text and type of information varied in the distractor alternatives 
were held constant across t r ia ls  for each subject and varied between 
subjects. The pre-stimulus prompt was either compatible or incompatible 
with the context surrounding the stimulus object or, in a third con­
dition, absent. Prompting conditions were varied across the t r ia l s  
given each subject in the experiment, i.e .,  prompting was treated as 
a within-subjects variable. Thus, the study employed a 2 X 3 X 3 
factorial design with repeated measures on the third factor such that 
s ix  independent groups were necessary. Accuracy of object recognition 
judgments in a four alternative forced-choice recognition test and
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confidence ratings corresponding to those judgments were used as measures 
of the effects of variable manipulations.
Subjects
The subjects were 72 (21 male) University of North Dakota college 
students participating in the experiment for credit in an undergraduate 
psychology course. Participation was limited to those individuals re­
porting normal vision without glasses or whose vision was corrected by 
contact lenses. Twelve subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 
s ix  groups resulting from the factorial combination of the two context 
conditions and the three distractor conditions.
Stimuli
Pi ctures
The 36 pictures used as stimuli were pen and ink line drawings 
made by a local a r t i s t  and depicted both indoor (24 pictures) and out­
door (12 pictures) s t i l l - l i f e  scenes. The a r t i s t  constructed the 
scenes to represent 36 unique and varied themes provided by the ex­
perimenter. Care was taken to avoid the presence of animals or people, 
and shadowing was minimized so that the value ( i .e . ,  relative l igh t ­
ness or darkness) of objects was roughly equivalent. Pictured objects 
were typical ( i.e .,  not unexpected— see Friedman, in press) of the 
scene in which they were embedded as determined jo in tly  by the a r t is t  
and the experimenter. The no-context pictures were generated by se­
lecting s ix  objects from each scene which represented a wide spatial 
distribution,reproducing them in the same locations as in the context 
pictures, and eliminating a ll other information. The resulting arrays
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of objects, and the context pictures, were then mounted for tachisto- 
scopic presentation. Figures 1 and 2 i l lu s t ra te  a stimulus presented 
under the two context conditions. When projected, all pictures sub­
tended a visual angle of 20 degrees horizontally and vertica lly . The 
objects ranged in size from 3 to 5 degrees of visual angle.
The pictures were each divided into four equal-sized quadrants 
and, for the 36 pictures, each of the four quadrants was randomly samp­
led nine times to provide the 36 target objects used in the recognition 
test. When more than one object was located in the sampled quadrant 
(this happened in only three instances) a f l ip  of a coin determined 
which object would be targeted from that quadrant and for that picture.
Prompts
Two one to three word phrases were generated as descriptors of 
each stimulus picture, one compatible with the context of the scene and 
one incompatible. For the set of compatible phrases, a group of 24 
undergraduate volunteers drawn from the same pool as the subjects used 
in the study proper were asked to give three one to three word phrases 
which they fe lt  accurately summarized or described each of the 36 
scenes. The most frequent descriptor from their responses was adopted 
as the compatible prompt for each picture. The incompatible prompt for 
each scene was generated by taking the less frequent responses from 
these subjects and pairing them with a picture expressing un unrelated 
theme. When the no-prompt condition was in effect, the words "NO 
PHRASE HERE" preceded the stimulus picture. The three types of phrases 
for each picture were typed in uppercase letters and centered on 
separate sheets of 22 X 28 cm paper for presentation.
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Fig. 1. Example of targeted object (toaster in lower left ' 
hand corner) presented under the context-present condition.
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Fig. 2. Example of targeted object (toaster in lower le ft-  
hand corner) presented under the context-absent condition.
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Written prompts were chosen rather than pictorial ones for two 
reasons. The purpose of the prompt was to activate in the subject a 
mental h o l is t ic  representation of the scene described by that prompt.
And while both written and pictorial prompts are comparable in provid­
ing ho l is t ic  or semantic information about pictures under b rie f ex­
posure conditions (see Potter 1975), the additional specific or detailed 
information available in a p ictorial format might give r ise  to a more 
embellished representation than desired in the present study. The 
second reason was a purely economic one; written prompts are less ex­
pensive and time consuming to produce than p ictoria l ones.
Each subject was presented with 12 pictures preceded by compatible 
prompts, 12 preceded by incompatible prompts, and 12 preceded by the 
phrase "NO PHRASE HERE." To control for the effect of prompt presenta­
tion order, 12 different prompt orders were randomly generated with the 
restrict ion  that no one type of prompt could precede more than three 
pictures in a row. Thus, the 12 subjects in each independent group 
each received a different prompt order, with the f i r s t  subject in one 
group receiving the same order as the f i r s t  subject in the other five 
groups, etc. In addition, the pairing of prompt types and pictures 
was counterbalanced, such that each picture was viewed preceded by each 
of the three types of prompts by four of the 12 subjects within each 
of the s ix  independent groups created by the factorial combination of 
the two context conditions and the three d istractor conditions.
Response Alternatives
The 108 response alternatives were pen and ink representations 
of objects drawn by the same a rt is t  who constructed the stimuli.
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Alternatives varying in scene information were drawn such that they 
were approximately the same true size as the targeted objects but from 
vastly different contexts (see Figure 3). Alternatives varying in ob­
ject information were different from the target object but from simi­
lar scenes (see Figure 4). The alternatives which were varied in the 
attribute information they contained were objects possessing the same 
general meaning but different along some physical dimension (see Figure 
5). The objects selected as transformations of object and attribute 
information also approximated their respective target objects in true size .
For a given response alternative condition, the target object 
and three distractors were drawn in the four ce lls  created by a 2 X 2 
matrix. Each quadrant was 10 X 10 cm and the target objects were the 
same size in both the picture and response matrix presentations.
Across the 36 pictures, each quadrant in the response matrix was oc­
cupied by a target object equally often. The four objects for each 
of the three response alternative conditions corresponding to each of 
the 36 pictures were drawn on separate sheets of 22 X 28 cm paper for 
presentati on.
Procedure
Prior to the arrival of a subject, the experimenter determined 
the appropriate prompt presentation order and distractor condition and 
made up a looseleaf notebook that alternated prompts and response a l ­
ternatives for a ll 36 pictures. Thus, the f i r s t  page in this notebook 
contained the prompt for the f i r s t  picture (the type determined by 
the presentation order in effect), followed by the response matrix
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Fig. 3. Example of the response matrix employed in the forced- 
choice object recognition test under the scene-distractor condition. 
This particular matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in 
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand cell 
represents the targeted object and the correct choice.
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Fig. 4. Example of the response matrix employed in the forced- 
choice object recognition test under the object-distractor condition. 
This particular matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in 
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand cell repre­
sents the targeted object and the correct choice.
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Fig. 5. Example of the response matrix employed in the forced- 
choice object recognition test under the attribute-d istractor condi­
tion. This particular matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in 
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand cell repre­
sents the targeted object and the correct choice.
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for the f i r s t  picture on the second page (determined by the d istractor 
condition in effect), followed by the third page containing the prompt 
corresponding to the second stimulus picture, etc. The subjects were 
run ind iv idually. Upon a rr iva l,  subjects were seated at a table con­
taining the notebook and a prepared answer sheet on which to record 
their recognition judgments. Also located on the table was a two- 
channel Gerbrands Harvard tachistoscope. Prior to the f i r s t  t r ia l ,  sub­
jects were read a prepared set of instructions (see Appendix A) which 
informed them that the study was concerned with the perception of 
b r ie f ly  presented pictures and instructed them in the procedure of the 
experimental task. Further, they were told that three types of phrases 
were possible for any given picture, and that over the course of view­
ing a ll 36 pictures the three types would occur equally often. They 
were simply told to "attend" to the phrases in any case. Subjects 
in it iated  a t r ia l  by turning the page in the looseleaf notebook and 
s i le n t ly  reading the prompt for the upcoming stimulus. They then im­
mediately looked into the tachistoscope and, as previously instructed, 
fixated an "X" centrally located on the screen where the picture was 
shown. Having indicated that they had done this by saying "READY," 
the stimulus picture was exposed for 150 msec. When the picture d is ­
appeared subjects looked back to the notebook where the matrix con­
taining the target object and three alternatives was then v is ib le  (the 
experimenter turned the page in the notebook while the subject viewed 
the stimulus picture). When the decision was made as to which of the 
four objects in the matrix they had seen in the picture, subjects 
recorded that decision on the answer sheet (see Appendix B). In ad­
dition, subjects were asked to assign a confidence rating to their
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judgments. The ratings were made on a scale anchored at five points 
from "0" (representing not at all certain) through "4" (representing 
extremely certain), and were recorded on the prepared answer sheet. 
Turning the page with the response matrix for the picture just viewed 
exposed the prompt corresponding to the next picture and served as 
the beginning of the next t r ia l .  Six practice t r ia ls  were succeeded 
by 30 experimental t r ia ls .  The entire procedure, including task instruc­
tions and debriefing, required approximately 45 minutes. The luminances 
of the pre- and post-exposure fie lds were equated and approximated 
that of the experimental room. A ll t r ia l s  were conducted in the same 
7 X 12 ft room free of noise and occupied only by the equipment neces­
sary for the experiment.
Data Analysis
Each subject yielded 36 responses on both the recognition accur­
acy and confidence measures. Only data from the 30 experimental t r ia ls  
were included in the analyses. Both accuracy and confidence measures 
were summed within the prompting conditions to obtain three totals for 
both measures for each subject, and these were summed across subjects 
within the same context X distractor condition to y ie ld  18 sets of 
totals for both measures.
Data for recognition accuracy were subjected to a three factor 
analysis of variance with one repeated factor as an omnibus test for 
significance. A fixed model was assumed. Internal comparisons computed 
on prompting condition and d istractor alternatives were accomplished 
using the Newman-Keuls procedure outlined in Winer (1971).
Confidence ratings for the 18 data sets generated by the factori­
al combination of the three variables were also subjected to an analysis
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of variance (fixed model); internal comparisons being computed with 
the Newman-Keuls procedure. While these data do not s t r ic t ly  conform 
to the scalar characteristics assumed in the employment of the analys- 
s i s  of variance, Tukey (1962) has empirically demonstrated that the 
relationship between the assignment of numbers to ordered classes and 
the unknown, ideal assignment along an interval or ratio scale is  sub­
stantial (between .60 and .98). Thus, the u t i l iza t ion  of the more ef­
f ic ient and powerful (compared to non-parametric alternatives) analy­
s i s  of variance and parametric post hoc comparison techniques appears 
ju st if ied .
CHAPTER I I I
RESULTS
Recognition Accuracy
The means and standard deviations for the accuracy measure are 
presented in Table 1 for each of the Context-Distractor-Prompt condi­
tions. I t  can be seen that the mean number of correct recognition 
judgments ranged from 3.583 when the target objects were viewed within 
the context of a scene (context-present condition), the d istractors in 
the recognition test were conceptually equivalent to the target object 
but varied along some physical dimension (attribute-distractor condi­
tion), and the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the context of 
the scene in which the target object was viewed or the scene in which 
i t  is  typ ica lly  found (compatible-prompt condition), to 8.333 under 
the same context and prompt conditions but where response alternatives 
were objects from a scene d iss im ila r to that in which the target was 
presented or in which it  is  typ ica lly  found (scene-distractor condi­
tion). This may be compared to a possible range for any condition of 
from 0.0 to 10.0, where a mean accuracy score of 2.5 would correspond 
to chance-level responding. Also presented in Table 1 are the means 
for each condition of the three major variables, collapsing across the 
conditions of the other two variables.
These accuracy scores were in i t ia l l y  analyzed using a three-way 
Analysis of Variance applied to the Context by Distractor by Prompt 
factorial combination. The results of this analysis are summarized in
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Table  1
Means and Standard Deviations: 
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Di stractor
Prompt Scene Object Attribute Context Prompt
Compatible 8.333
(1.303)
5.167
(1.528)
3.583
(1.311)
5. 847**
Present Neutral 6.833
(1.528)
4.667
(1.969)
3.667
(1.155) 5.333
5.278
Incompatible 6.917 5.000 3.833 5.083
Context
(1.832) (1.206) (1.193)
Compatible 8.167
(2.038)
5.417
(1.782)
4.417
(1.782)
Absent Neutral 6.750
(1.288)
5.417
(1.564)
4.333
(1.614) 5.472
Incompatible 5. 500 
(2.067)
4.583
(1.443)
4.667
(1.303)
Distractor 7.083* 5.042 4.083
*Mean d iffers s ign if icant ly  from the lowest mean (p < .01) and the next lower mean (p < .05)
**Mean differs s ign if icant ly  (p < .01) from the two lower means
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Table 2. Both the type of distractor objects employed in the object 
recognition test and the compatabi1ity (relative to the physical con­
text in which the target object was embedded or in which i t  is  usually 
found) of the prompt preceding the stimulus presentation were s t a t i s ­
t ic a l ly  s ign if icant sources of variation. In addition, the interaction 
of these two variables was sign ificant.
Using the Newman-Keuls procedure for comparing the differences 
between means, i t  was determined that target objects were recognized 
s ign if icant ly  more often when the scene-distractor condition was in 
effect than when distractor objects were conceptually different objects 
from sim ilar scenes (object-distractor condition) or when the attribute- 
distractor condition was administered (see Table 1 for significance 
levels). Recognition accuracy under these latter two conditions did not 
d iffe r  s ign if icantly .  Regarding the differences in accuracy for the 
various prompting conditions, the compatible-prompt condition resulted 
in s ign if ican t ly  better performance than either the neutral-prompt ( i.e .,  
the absence of a meaningful scene description) or the incompatible- 
prompt ( i.e .,  a pre-stimulus phrase which gave an inaccurate or mislead­
ing description of the stimulus scene or of the scene in which the target 
object would most probably be found) conditions (see Table 1 for prob­
a b i l i t ie s ) .  The observed differences between the neutral and incom­
patible prompting conditions fa iled to reach sta t is t ica l significance.
Subsequent analysis of the Distractor by Prompt interaction using 
a test for simple effects (see Kirk, 1968) revealed that prompting man­
ipulations had a s ign if icant effect only when the response alternatives 
in the test were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes (p. < .01). The observed 
superiority of accuracy performance under the scene d istractor condition
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Table 2
Context by Distractor by Prompt ANOVA Summary: 
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Sum of Mean
Source df Squares Squares F
Context (C) 1 1.04 1.04 .28
Distractor (D) 2 338.08 168.04 46.21***
C X D 2 16.08 8.04 2.20
Error (between) 66 241.42 3.66 -
Prompt (P) 2 22.69 11.35 5.96** *
C X P 2 6.19 3.10 1.63
D X P 4 34.39 8.60 4.52**
C X D X P 4 4.72 1.18 .62
Error (within) 132 251.33 1.90 -
Total 215 915.95
**p < .01
***p  < .001
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was s ign if icant,  regardless of the particular prompting condition em­
ployed (p < .01). The interactive nature of these two variables is repre­
sented p ic to r ia l ly  in Figure 6. As shown in that figure, providing sub­
jects with an accurate description of the scene portrayed in the stimulus 
picture increased accuracy in the object recognition test, but only when 
the response alternatives in that test were objects from d iss im ila r 
scenes. When alternatives were the same object conceptually as the tar­
get but different in physical appearance or when they were conceptually 
different objects but from sim ilar scenes, performance was not altered 
s ign if icant ly .  Figure 6 also i l lu stra te s  the finding that scene distrac- 
tors resulted in superior performance within each of the three prompting 
conditions, when compared to object or attribute d istractors.
An unexpected finding was the fa ilure  to observe a s ign if icant  in ­
teraction between the Context and Distractor factors (see Table 2). 
Previous research (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) has established that 
the presence or absence of scene context interacts with the type of d is ­
tractor objects employed in subsequent recognition tests in affecting a 
subject 's ab i l ity  to accurately recognize objects. Antes and Metzger 
(in press) found that objects viewed within the context of a scene were 
better recognized when the response alternatives in the recognition test 
were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes, whereas no differences in recogni­
tion performance were found when context-present versus context-absent 
conditions were compared when the response alternatives were objects 
that were conceptually different but from the same or sim ilar scenes 
(e.g., a toaster served as an alternative to a targeted blender). As a 
consequence of the fa ilure  to discover this expected interaction between
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6. Mean number of correct recognition responses for the conditions resulting from the 
bination of Distractor and Prompt variables.
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Context and Distractor, additional analyses were performed in an attempt 
to understand this discrepancy.
An examination of the means (Table 1) for the scene and attribute 
distractor conditions together with those from the context-present and 
context-absent conditions reveals an apparent pattern. When distractors 
were from d iss im ila r  scenes accuracy of recognition judgments was superior 
in the context-present condition, but when distractors were objects con­
ceptually identical but with some physical attribute altered the superi­
or ity  in accuracy was in favor of the context-absent condition. D iffe r­
ences between the two context conditions appeared nil under the object- 
d istractor condition. Such an interrelationship between Context and 
Distractor may not have been revealed in the orig inal analysis which 
included all three conditions of the Distractor factor, so a second 
Analysis of Variance was performed with the object-distractor condition 
omi tted.
This analysis, summarized in Appendix C, resulted in the expected 
s ign if icant  interaction between Context and Distractor (p < .05). A 
subsequent analysis of the simple effects showed that accuracy perfor­
mance was best when distractors were from d iss im ila r scenes, regardless 
of the context condition (p < .01). The superiority in accuracy under 
the context-present versus context-absent conditions was near (.05< p< .10) 
but fa iled to reach significance when distractor objects were from d is ­
s im ilar scenes. Context-absent performance was better than context- 
present performance, but again not s ign if icant ly  (.05< p < .10), when 
the attribute-d istractor condition was in effect. Thus, while significance 
was not attained, a trend in the expected direction was clearly evidenced.
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A more exact replication of prior researches into the combined 
effects of scene context and the type of d istractor objects used in the 
recognition task (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) was the factorial 
combination of the two context conditions with the scene-distractor 
and object-distractor conditions employed in the present study. An 
Analysis of Variance performed on this combination and reported in Appen­
dix C revealed that the Context by Distractor interaction approached, 
but again did not reach s ign if icant levels.
A final analysis undertaken on the accuracy measures examined the 
fa ilure  to achieve a s ign if icant Prompt by Context interaction (see 
Table 2). Such an interaction had been predicted prior to data collec­
tion, and an inspection of the means presented in Table 1 for the va r i­
ous conditions involved reveals that context-absent performance was 
better when stimuli were preceded by compatible prompts, whereas under 
the context-present condition there were apparently no substantial 
differences in accuracy between the compatible-prompt and incompatible- 
prompt conditions. For this final analysis then, the neutral-prompt 
condition was excluded and the remaining two prompt conditions were 
facto r ia lly  combined with the two context conditions and subjected to 
an Analysis of Variance. Results from this analysis, summarized in 
Appendix C, were consistent with those obtained from the in it ia l  analy­
s is  in showing a non-significant interaction between Context and 
Prompt. The effects of these two variables upon recognition accuracy 
were apparently independent, with compatible prompts resulting in 
superior accuracy when compared to neutral or incompatible prompts 
regardless of the presence or absence of a physical context when pre­
senting the target objects.
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Confidence Ratings
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for the con­
fidence ratings assigned by subjects to their recognition judgments.
The possible range was from 0.0 (complete lack of confidence) to 4.0 
(extreme certainty), and the obtained range for the mean confidence 
ratings was from 1.075 in the context-present, attr ibute-d istractor, 
incompatible-prompt condition, to 2.175 in the context-present, scene 
distractor, compatible-prompt condition.
These confidence ratings were analyzed using a three-way Analysis 
of Variance applied to the Context by Distractor by Prompt combination. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. Consistent with 
the accuracy scores, the type of distractor employed in the object 
recognition test and the type of prompt presented prior to the stimulus 
s ign if ican t ly  affected subjects' confidence ratings. Unlike accuracy, 
these ratings were not d if fe ren tia lly  affected by an interaction of 
Distractor and Prompt, suggesting the independence of the two in their 
effects upon a subject 's assessment of his or her success at detecting 
the target object.
Using the Newman-Keuls procedure for comparing means, i t  was 
found that subjects were more confident in their recognition judgments 
under the scene-distractor and object-distractor conditions than under 
the attribute-d istractor condition (p < .01). Subjects were thus 
least confident when the distractor objects were conceptually identi­
cal to the target object but varied in physical appearance. No 
s t a t i s t ic a l ly  s ign if icant difference was found when scene and object 
distractors were compared with each other, though subjects were
Table  3
Means and Standard Deviations: 
Confidence Ratings
Di stractor
Prompt Scene Object Attribute Context Prompt
Compatible 2.175 
( .928)
1.833 
( .549)
1.225 
( -742)
1.745**
Present Neutral 1.917 
( .861)
1.942 
( .540)
1.142 
( .576) 1.675
—
1.635
Incompatible 2.067 1.700 1.075 1.582
Context
( .617) ( .598) ( .705)
C o m n a t  i h 1 ow u i | - ' u  o  i v j  i v. 1.942 
( .530)
1.825 
( .515)
1.475 
( .533)
Absent Neutral 1.800 
( .433)
1.717
( .730)
1.292 
( .552) 1.622
Incompatible 1.633 
( .854)
1.733 1.283 
( -691)( .576)
Distractor 1.922* 1.792* 1.249
*Mean differs s ign if ican t ly  (p '< .01) from the lowest mean
**Mean differs s ign if icant ly  from the lowest mean (p < .01) and the next lower mean (p < .05)
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Table 4
Context by Distractor by Prompt ANOVA Summary: 
Confidence Ratings
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F
Context (C) 1 .12 .12 .13
Distractor (D) 2 18.54 9.27 9.66***
C X D 2 1.97 .99 1 .03
Error (between) 66 63.37 .96 -
Prompt (P) 2 1.12 .56 3.45*
C X P 2 .03 .02 .09
D X P 4 .19 .05 .29
C X D X P 4 .51 .13 .79
Error (within) 132 21.43 .16 -
Total 215 107.29
*p < .05
* * * p  < .001
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somewhat more confident in their responses when distractors were varied 
in scene information (see Table 3).
Regarding prompt effects, subjects were s ign if icant ly  more con­
fident in their recognition responses when stimuli were preceded by 
compatible scene descriptions than when preceded by either neutral 
(p < .05) or incompatible (p < .01) descriptors. Subject confidence 
did not vary s ign if ican t ly  as a function of whether stimuli were pre­
ceded by neutral or incompatible prompts.
Weighted Confidence Scores
In addition to accuracy and confidence scores, a third measure 
was created to function as an estimate of subjects' a b i l ity  to appropri­
ately place their confidence. To create such a measure, confidence 
ratings were signed or weighted according to whether or not the recog­
nition response given by the subject had been accurate or inaccurate 
(see Palmer 1975b). Thus, a subject who gave a confidence rating of 
(2) to a correct recognition judgment would receive a weighted con­
fidence score of (+2), while a subject that assigned a confidence rat­
ing of (2) to an incorrect recognition judgment received a weighted 
confidence score of (-2) for that stimulus. When subjects indicated 
that they were not at a ll confident in the selection that they had 
made ( i.e .,  assigned a confidence rating of (0) to their recognition 
judgment), then they received a weighted confidence score of (0) re­
gardless of whether their recognition response was accurate or in­
accurate.
Tabl 
weighted c
e 5 presents the means and standard deviations for these 
onfidence scores for each of the Context-Distractor-Prompt
Table  5
Means and Standard Deviations: 
Weighted Confidence Scores
Di stractor
Prompt Scene Object Attribute Context Prompt
Compatible 1.975 
( .952)
.392 
( .765)
-.092 
( .464)
.812 *
Present Neutral 1.433 
( .873)
.308 
( .918)
-.008 
( .392) .656
.621
Incompatible 1.367 .533 0.000 .621
Context
( .934) ( .505) ( .407)
Compatible 1.558 
( .850)
.750 
( -713)
.292 
( .775)
Absent Neutral 1.233 
( .818)
.600 
( .441)
.158 
( -691)
.713
Incompatible .925 .533 .367
( .689) ( .576) ( .440)
Di stractor 1.415** .519* .119
★
Mean differs s ign if icantly  (p < .01) from the next lower mean
**Mean differs s ign if icant ly  (p < .01) from the two lower means
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combinations. Here the possible range of mean score values is from 
-4.0 (inappropriately placing extreme confidence in incorrect recogni­
tion responses) to +4.0 (appropriately placing extreme confidence in 
correct retognition responses), with the value of chance or random 
responding undetermined. The observed range, as indicated in Table 5, 
was from -.092 for the context-present, attribute-distractor, com­
patible-prompt condition, to 1.975 for the same context and prompt 
conditions but where response alternatives were from d iss im ila r  scenes.
These weighted confidence scores, representing a synthesis of the 
accuracy and confidence measures, were in i t ia l l y  analyzed with a 
three-way Analysis of Variance applied to the Context by Distractor 
by Prompt factorial combination. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 6. The effect of varying the type of d istractors 
in the recognition test s ign if ican t ly  affected scores on this measure, 
as did the combination of Context and Distractor variables. The com­
parison of mean weighted confidence scores for the three types of 
distractors showed that subjects were more capable of accurately judg­
ing their performance when the test d istractors were objects from d is ­
s im ilar scenes than when they were either different objects from 
sim ila r scenes (p < .01) or the same objects whose physical attributes 
were varied (p < .01). Furthermore, different objects from sim ilar 
scenes resulted in a greater accuracy in confidence assignments than 
did the condition where objects in the recognition test differed in 
attribute information (p < .01).
The Context by Distractor interaction effects upon this weighted 
confidencd score are depicted in Figure 7. A subsequent analysis of
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Table 6
-
Context by Distractor by Prompt ANOVA Summary 
Weighted Confidence Scores
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F
Context (C' 1 .17 .17 .24
Distractor (D) 2 63.40 31.70 43.41***
C X D 2 4.59 2.30 3.14*
Error (betn/een) 66 48.19 .73 -
Prompt (P) 2 1.76 .88 2.33
C X P 2 .18 .09 .24
D X P 4 3.43 .86 2.26
C X D X P 4 .64 .16 .42
Error (wi thiin) 132 49.99
Total 215 172.36
*p < .05
* * *p  < .00
Mean
Weighted 
Confi dence
combination
1.750
1.500 SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
Distractor Type: 
SSSS - Scene 
0000 - Object
1.250 SSSS SSSS AAAA - Attribute
SSSS SSSS
SSSS SSSS
1.000 SSSS SSSS
SSSS SSSS
SSSS SSSS
.750 SSSS SSSS
SSSS SSSS
SSSS SSSS 0000
.500 SSSS SSSS 0000
SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000
SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000
.250 SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000 AAAA
SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000 AAAA
SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000 AAAA
0 SSSS 0000 SSSS 0000 AAAA
ccccJJJJ 0000 AAAA SSSS nnnnw w w w AAAA
SSSS 0000 AAAA SSSS 0000 AAAA
-.250 SSSS 0000 AAAA SSSS 0000 AAAA
SSSS 0000 AAAA SSSS 0000 AAAA
SSSS 0000 AAAA SSSS 0000 AAAA
SSSS 0000 AAAA SSSS 0000 AAAA
Present Absent
Context
Figure 7. Mean weighted confidence scores for the conditions resulting from the factorial 
of Context and Distractor variables.
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simple effects indicated that variations in this measure approached but 
did not reach s t a t i s t ic a l ly  s ign if icant levels (.05 < p < .10) when 
context-present and context-absent conditions were compared for the 
situation where the response alternatives were from d iss im ila r scenes. 
There was a trend in the data indicating that scores were higher under 
context-present than context-absent condition when distractors were 
from d iss im ila r scenes. When the two context conditions were contrasted 
within the object-distractor and attribute-distractor conditions the 
observed variations in weighted confidence scores did not even approach 
s ign ificant levels. I t  can be seen in Figure 7 that the manipulation 
of recognition test d istractor objects resulted in s ign if icant (p < .01) 
differences when compared at both levels of the Context variable, with 
scene distractor conditions resulting in higher weighted confidence 
scores than either of the other two distractor conditions. The d if fe r ­
ences between object and attribute distractor conditions were not s i g ­
n ificant under either context conditions.
Accuracy, Confidence Ratings, and Weighted Confidence
Scores Summarized
The major results from this investigation indicate that the type 
of response alternatives or distractors employed in the object recogni­
tion test, and the compatabi1ity  of the pre-stimulus prompt (relative 
to the context in which the target object was viewed or the context of 
the scene in which it  is typ ica lly  found) substantia lly  influenced both 
subjects' accuracy in the recognition test and their confidence in 
their selections. Response alternatives from d iss im ila r  scenes con­
s isten t ly  resulted in better recognition performance and greater con­
fidence than when the test required that target objects be selected
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alternatives from sim ilar scenes but conceptually different 
tives that were conceptually identical but varied along some 
imension. Subject confidence was a more sensitive measure of 
tion, as ratings were s ign if ican t ly  smaller ( i .e .,  subjects 
confident) when distractors were attribute rather than object 
s. The synthesized weighted confidence score was the most 
measure of the three, with all three distractor types result- 
n if icantly  different scores when contrasted with each other, 
ccuracy of the recognition judgments and subjects' confidence 
ced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the 
icture (array). For neither measure were any differences 
t between response given under the neutral and incompatible 
ditions. The a b i l ity  of subjects to appropriately place 
dence in an object selection was not d if fe ren t ia lly  in flu - 
ny one of the three prompting conditions, 
ect accuracy on the recognition test was also influenced by 
ction of the Distractor and Prompt variables, with greater 
esulting when compatible prompts preceded stimuli i f  the 
objects used in the test were from d iss im ila r  scenes, but 
is tractors were from sim ilar scenes or differed from the 
ect sole ly in physical appearance. Prompt and Distractor 
re independent in their effects upon subjects' confidence 
d upon the subjects' accuracy in assigning those confidence
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apparent but non-significant tendency for Context and Dis- 
interact evidenced in the accuracy and confidence scores 
gnificant levels using the weighted confidence scores.
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Subsequent analyses revealed that distractor type was a substantial fac­
tor at both levels of Context, but that the presence of absence of con­
text approached significance only for the scene and attribute distractor 
conditions. Looking at the Context by Distractor interaction using 
the recognition accuracy measure when the object-distractor condition 
had been excluded also resulted in overall significance, and the pattern 
found with the weighted confidence scores using a ll three distractor 
conditions was replicated . . . scene distractors resulted in s i g n i f i ­
cantly higher performance (accuracy) compared to attribute d istractors, 
regardless of the context condition, and the presence or absence of 
context varied substantially but not s ign if icant ly  when contrasted 
separately under the scene and attribute d istractor conditions.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
It  might be helpful to begin this discussion by reviewing the 
theoretical foundation for this investigation as proposed at the con­
clusion of the Introduction. In keeping with the duplex theory of 
picture perception, i t  was proposed that one's perception and subse­
quent recognition of pictured objects and scenes results from the 
acquisition of several sources of information. One source of informa­
tion is the product of a direct foveal inspection of objects within a 
scene such that the detail of the inspected objects is determined and 
available for further use by the observer. A second source of in for­
mation is derived from the physical context depicted in the scene 
( i f  any), which functions as a meaningful background for the pictured 
objects, and in the present study is  referred to as external context. 
The third source of information about objects and scenes resides 
within the observer in the form of a memorial network, organized on 
the basis of past experiences with sim ilar objects and scenes, which 
provides information very sim ilar to that gleaned from the scene's 
physical context, and in the present study is  referred to as internal 
context. These latter two sources of information combine to result 
in a ho l is t ic  characterization or schema of the scene, containing a 
more general than specif ic  type of information, and helping to make
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possible an eff ic ient and rapid interpretation of pictured objects and 
scenes. The detailed information about pictured objects is  eventually 
assimilated into this representation, making i t  more complete and 
veridical. The present study was designed to allow an assessment of 
the separate and combined effects of these three sources of information 
as they function to present the observer with a meaningful visual experi­
ence of p ic to r ia l ly  represented objects and scenes.
Recognition Accuracy
A review of past research in object and scene perception led 
d irectly to the formulation of certain hypotheses regarding the rela­
tionship of these informational sources as they might influence accuracy 
performance on an object recognition task. Specif ica lly ,  i t  was ex­
pected that subjects would be most accurate on such a task when both 
internal and external sources of contextual information were available, 
provided that such information was appropriate to the scene from which 
the targeted objects would typ ica lly  come. When one type of con­
textual information was not present, i t  was anticipated that subjects 
would perform less well, and when the available contextual information 
was either absent or conflicting, i t  was predicted that subjects would 
perform at chance levels on the recognition task. I t  was also hy­
pothesized that the type of response alternatives employed in the recog­
nition task, varied to obtain an indication of the type of information 
encoded and available to the observer, would interact with the presence 
or absence of the two sources of contextual information. The expected 
form of this interaction was that context manipulations would have 
their greatest impact on recognition accuracy when the distractors
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were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes ( i .e .,  in the scene-distractor con­
dit ion), or when they were objects from sim ilar scenes but possessing 
a different generic name ( i.e .,  under the object-distractor condition). 
When the distractor objects were identical in name but different in 
appearance ( i.e .,  the attribute-distractor condition) compared to the 
target object, i t  was anticipated that the manipulations in contextual 
information would be ineffectual in producing differential accuracy rates 
in the object recognition task.
The results obtained from this investigation were predominantly 
but not wholly in accord with these a priori expectations. The varia­
tion in the type of distractor objects employed in the recognition test 
resulted in s ign if icant  differences in performance regardless of the 
presence or absence of contextual information (either internal or ex­
ternal). Further, the type of internal contextual information made 
available to the subject seemed to be a s ign if icant  factor in it s  effect 
upon recognition accuracy, but only under the condition where the 
task employed distractor objects from d iss im ila r scenes; the expected 
interaction between distractor type and the type of internal context 
available was thus evidenced. Inconsistent with a priori predictions 
was the finding that the two sources of contextual information were 
apparently independent, with variations in internal context s i g n i f i ­
cantly affecting performance in the manner indicated above, while 
the presence or absence of a physical context failed to d iffe ren t ia lly  
affect performance on the recognition task. Also unexpected was the 
fa ilure  to find a s ign if icant interaction between the presence or 
absence of external context and the type of distractor objects employed 
in the recognition task. As noted in the Results, this interaction
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was indeed indicated by the data, but failed to reach s ta t is t ic a l  s ig ­
nificance.
In the current study, subjects were essentia lly  confronted with 
a discrimination task . . . accurate recognition responses were re­
corded when subjects were able to discriminate between a targeted ob­
ject from a previously viewed stimulus and three alternative objects 
not previously viewed. A pertinent question is ,  "How d if f ic u lt  was the 
discrimination required of the subject?" The results indicated that 
subjects were most accurate in selecting the target object when general 
information about the scene from which the objects would typically 
come was required ( i.e .,  the response alternatives were objects from 
scenes d iss im ila r  to those in which the target object would usually be 
found). When more specific  information concerning the identity or 
appearance of the target object was required, subject accuracy was s i g ­
n if icantly  reduced. This latter situation occurred when distractor 
objects in the recognition test were objects from sim ilar scenes but 
possessing a different name than the target, or when the d istractors 
had the same generic name but were different in appearance from the tar­
get object. Empirically then, discrimination d if f icu lty  was greatest 
when the form of the recognition task was such that specific  informa­
tion about the target object was required, and least when i t  required 
only general information. This consistent difference in d if f icu lty ,  
found across the other two factors (internal and external context) and 
regardless of the interaction between the type of distractor employed 
and the type of internal context available, is consistent with and 
predictable from the duplex theory of picture perception. As discussed 
in the Introduction, that theory postulates that while both general
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and specif ic  information about pictured objects and scenes is  immediately 
available to the observer, the proportion of a ll potentially available 
general information exceeds the proportion of a ll potentially available 
specific  information during the f i r s t  few seconds of viewing. There­
fore, general information is more influential in its  effects upon a sub­
je c t 's  recognition response when that response is based upon information 
gathered from very brie f stimulus exposures, as in the present study.
The finding that recognition accuracy was superior when internal 
contextual information ( i .e .,  scene descriptions or prompts) was pro­
vided prior to viewing the stimuli is  complicated by the interaction of 
this factor with the form of the recognition task employed with a given 
subject ( i.e .,  what type of distractor objects were involved). Sub­
jects were most accurate when scene descriptions were compatible with 
the scene or array of objects they were to view, less accurate when the 
stimulus was preceded by a neutral phrase, and least accurate when 
the scene description was incompatible with the scene or object array 
i t  preceded. This pattern of differences was s ign if icant  only under 
the testing condition where the response alternatives used in the recog­
nition test were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes. Such a result is 
highly supportive of the view that scene descriptions presented prior 
to the stimuli were being used primarily at the time of response ( i .e . ,  
when the subject was required to select one object from among four pos­
s ib le  objects as having been viewed previously). Under such an inter­
pretation, internal contextual information may be utilized  by the 
observer to rule-out or ignore objects in the recognition test that 
seem inappropriate to the context of the scene in which the target ob­
ject was presented (or in which i t  is  typ ica lly  found). Such a response
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strategy, i f  employed by subjects in the present study, would lead to 
exactly the pattern of differences observed. Subjects could use the 
general information about the scene and objects contained in the verbal 
description when the form of the recognition task given the subject 
required only general information to make an accurate recognition judg­
ment. Such a response strategy would be of l i t t le  use when the recogni­
tion task required specif ic  information about the targeted object. In 
the present study the scene descriptions were far too general (e.g., 
"KITCHEN SCENE") to provide the necessary specific information, and 
performance under such test conditions ( i .e . ,  when specific  information 
was required) was indeed not affected d iffe ren t ia lly  by the various 
types of prompts or scene descriptions preceding the stimulus presenta­
tion. I t  is  expected that a sim ilar pattern of findings would result 
even i f  nci pictures were presented.
The above response interpretation of the interaction between in­
ternal context and distractor type is entirely consistent with the sug­
gestion by Antes, Penland, and Metzger (manuscript in preparation) that 
contextual information is  util ized  both during perception, and at the 
time of response. According to Antes, et a l. ,  available physical context 
influences the probability that any given pictured object w ill be at­
tended and processed perceptually, and influences the course and outcome 
of that processing. Further, at the time of response in a recognition 
task, the subject goes through a two-stage decision process: The sub­
ject questions, "Do I remember seeing any of these objects in the scene 
(array) that I just viewed?" I f  the response is  affirmative, then the 
subject selects the object that was recognized. I f  the response is 
negative, then a second question is posed, "Which of the objects
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available for selection most probably came from the scene (array) that 
I just viewed?" The subject 's selection reflects the answer to this 
last question. The interpretation given the Distractor by Prompt inter­
action found in the present investigation is  obviously consistent with 
such a two-stage response process, extended to include the influence of 
internal contextual information; that i s ,  information available prior 
to viewing the scene (array of objects).
I f  varying the type ( i.e .,  compatability relative to the scene or 
object array serving as the stimulus) of internal context made available 
to the subject in the form of a general scene description had resulted 
in d ifferential accuracy performance under the attribute-d istractor con­
dition, then such a finding would evidence the perceptual effects of 
internally based contextual information. However, such evidence was 
not found in the present study. I t  is  possible to speculate about the 
reasons that the proposed perceptual effects were not observed by con­
sidering the present role of prompting. Providing subjects with the 
description of a scene before they viewed the stimulus scene (array) 
represented an attempt to activate a memory network in the observer cor­
responding to the prompted scene . . .  a network f i l le d  with general 
and prototypical information about the described scene, bu ilt  from the 
products of previous perceptual experiences with such scenes. Such 
activation, i t  is  presumed, is  o rd inarily  accomplished by the obser­
ve r 's  knowledge of where he or she is in the world at a given moment in 
time. That knowledge activates a set of expectations (founded upon 
information contained in the memorial network) about what scenes and 
objects the observer i s  most l ike ly  to encounter next. For example, 
i t  is  probable that, when entering a house, one w ill encounter something
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commonly called a l iv in g  room, a kitchen, bedrooms, etc., and in those 
rooms will observe a sofa, a toaster, and beds, etc. The current usage 
of verbal scene descriptions to a r t i f i c ia l l y  activate such a set of ex­
pectations may well have been unsuccessful. A contributing factor to 
this fa ilure  may have been the chosen procedure of exposing subjects to 
a combination of compatible, neutral, and incompatible descriptions. 
Knowledge that the verbal descriptions were sometimes inappropriate to 
the stimulus may have caused subjects to adopt a wait-and-see strategy, 
whereby the stimulus scene (array) was processed perceptually and the 
outcome of that processing was used to compare against the verbal descrip­
tion. I f  such a comparison revealed that the description provided was 
accurate ( i .e . ,  compatible with the scene or array in which the target 
object was embedded), then the description was employed at the time of 
response in the manner proposed in the preceding paragraph.
The fa ilure  to influence the perceptual process by prompting in 
the present study was also evidenced in a recent work by Biederman (1980, 
in press). In the study reported by Biederman, subjects given advance 
information (in the form of verbal scene descriptions) about the mean­
ing of a stimulus scene were no more accurate or faster in detecting 
objects within those scenes or objects that had undergone v io lations 
(Biederman 1977), than subjects who had received no advance information.
He argued that the process employed to perceive and interpret pictured 
objects and scenes is so rapid and eff ic ient that l i t t l e  is  gained by 
providing subjects with a verbal description of a scene prior to their 
experience with it. Consistent with the interpretation given the 
present results is  Biederman's suggestion that what is  influenced by 
such advance information is not perception, "but some inferential
103
process that follows or proceeds in advance of, perception" (p. 35,
1980, in press [emphasis added]).
In that same discussion, Biederman also noted that the process 
of presenting subjects with a verbal description of scenes may actually 
interfere with the normal perceptual processes entailed in viewing and 
processing scene information. Ordinarily, perceptual processing of a 
real-world scene is  not preceded by a period of verbally processing 
semantically related material. I f  such interference occurred in the 
present study as a result of verbally prompting subjects, i t  may help 
to explain the two unexpected findings noted earlie r  and discussed below.
Regarding the apparent independence of the two sources of contextu­
al information in their effects upon recognition accuracy, i t  is  pos­
s ib le  that the manipulations employed in th is  study were simply not ef­
fective in demonstrating the impact on perception of either internal 
or external contextual information. The verbal prompts might have been 
more effective had they a ll been compatible in nature, but the current 
design (where compatible, neutral, and incompatible prompts were mixed) 
may have induced subjects to attempt to ignore all contextual informa­
tion provided them, at least until such time as they could judge i t  to 
be accurate relative to the stimulus scene or array. An alternative 
p o ss ib i l ity  is  that an independence of internal and external contexts 
truly exists, contrary to the duplex theory (see Introduction). Per­
haps each type of context adds something unique to the scene charac­
terization, such that when one source of contextual information is  ab­
sent the void cannot be f i l le d  by the presence of the other. Also 
implied in this latter notion is that, under certain circumstances,
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neither source of context may be utilized  in the construction of the 
scene characterization.
A verbal processing interference effect may also bear on the 
fa ilure  of the current study to replicate the findings of previous 
researches (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) showing that the presence 
or absence of external contextual information interacts with the type of 
response alternatives in the recognition test, in influencing subject 
accuracy. As mentioned before, such an 'interaction was indicated but 
narrowly fa iled to reach sta t is t ic a l  significance. A potential explana­
tion for this fa ilure  is  that the verbal processing required of sub­
jects interfered with the usual course of v isua lly  processing scene and 
object information. By design, the current investigation was supposed 
to be capable of testing this p o ss ib i l ity  by the inclusion of a no­
prompt condition. However, as this condition s t i l l  entailed a certain 
amount of verbal prior to visual processing ( i.e .,  the subject s t i l l  had 
to read the words, "NO PHRASE HERE"), i t  provided no clear test of this 
interpretation.
The strong tendency for variation of externally based contextual 
information to interact with the type of d istractor objects employed 
in the recognition has important implications which ju st ify  it s  d iscus­
sion. This finding is  perhaps best explained by invoking the d ist in c ­
tion between the top-down and bottom-up processing of p ictoria l in fo r­
mation for later recognition (see Friedman, in press; Lindsay & Norman 
1977; Palmer 1975b). According to this d ist inction, two types of in ­
formation processing can be identified. One type is  referred to as 
bottom-up or data-driven processing, indicated when processing begins 
with the arrival of data from the stimulus, and where each stage in
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the processing sequence acts upon the outcome of lower processing 
stages until a recognition judgment is reached. The second type of 
information processing is called top-down or conceptually-driven, and 
is characterized by processing in itiated by some conceptualization or 
hypothesis about the stimulus to be recognized, and proceeds by seek­
ing evidence (data) to confirm or disconfirm this in i t ia l  conceptualiza­
tion. I f  confirming evidence is  available and there is l i t t l e  data to 
deny the hypothesis, that conceptualization is retained by the observer 
and becomes the basis of the recognition judgment. I f  the evidence re­
futes the currently operating hypothesis, a new conceptualization is 
adopted and the process continues. As pointed out by Lindsay and Norman 
(1977), both types of information processing usually occur together; 
that i s ,  information is  extracted and processed from the stimulus, and 
a conceptualization guides this processing and part ia lly  influences what 
information w ill be extracted from the stimulus in the future ( i .e . ,  
with additional viewing of the stimulus). However, depending upon the 
conditions present at the time of viewing, one type of information 
processing may dominate the perceptual processing of the stimulus at 
a particular moment in time.
I f  i t  is  realized that the recognition task in the present study 
functions not only as a test, but also as an effective stimulus for 
the subject, then it  may reasonably be argued that the particular form 
of the test employed ( i.e .,  the particular type of response alterna­
tives used) stimulated subjects to adopt either a predominantly bottom- 
up or top-down processing strategy. The adoption of such a strategy 
could then be expected to result in d ifferential accuracy performance
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relative to the presence or absence of physical context surrounding the 
object to be recognized.
As discussed earlier, general, specif ic, or a combination of the 
two types of information may be required of a subject depending upon the 
type of distractor objects employed in the object recognition test. 
General information about the scene from which the targeted object would 
typ ica lly  come was required for an accurate recognition judgment to be 
made when the distractor objects were from scenes d iss im ila r  to those 
in which the target was usually found. When the response alternatives 
in the recognition test were objects usually found in a scene s im ila r to 
that in which the target was presented but having a different identity 
(e.g., when a toaster must be chosen from among a pitcher, cookbook, 
and place setting not present in the stimulus), more specific  informa­
tion was required for an accurate selection to occur. One might guess 
that in this latter situation a subject would probably process the con­
tent of the scene to the point that a l i s t  of object names was attained. 
In the most demanding condition in th is study, the distractor objects 
used to assess recognition accuracy were objects that carried the same 
name or label as the targeted object, but had been varied along some 
physical dimension such that they differed from the target object in 
appearance. Clearly in this condition subjects would need to process 
the particular objects which composed the scene in considerable detail, 
i f  an accurate judgment was to ensue. Since i t  is  a reasonable assump­
tion that subjects would adopt the most e ff ic ient processing strategy 
available, i t  is  probable that when general information was required 
subjects adopted a predominantly top-down approach to processing in ­
formation from the scene (array), when specific  information was
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required they utilized a predominantly bottom-up processing strategy, 
and when a combination of general and specific  information was necessi­
tated subjects employed both types of information processing approaches 
to maximize the rapid a va i lab il ity  of both types of information.
The proposal that the distractor type evokes a particular pro­
cessing approach from the subject is consistent with the interpretation 
given the distractor type effect presented earlier. I t  was noted at 
that time that the proportion of a ll potentially available general in fo r­
mation exceeds the proportion of a ll potentially available specific  in ­
formation during the f i r s t  few seconds of viewing. I t  is suggested that, 
since the top-down strategy is best suited to extracting general in fo r­
mation and the bottom-up strategy is best suited to extracting specific  
information, where the observer is  confronted with an extremely limited 
amount of viewing time, the amount of general information extracted 
when employing a top-down approach w ill exceed the amount of specific  
information extracted while employing a bottom-up processing approach. 
Thus, assuming the subject has employed the most eff ic ient information 
processing strategy available to him or her, i t  would be expected (and 
i t  was found) that a subject faced with d istractor objects from d is ­
s im ila r scenes would be more accurate in recognizing target objects 
than one confronted with distractors that varied from the target only 
in physical appearance.
Support for the contention that different processing approaches 
are adopted as a function of varying the d istractors in the recognition 
test may also be found in subject comments. A clear pattern was found 
showing that subjects in the context-present condition reported that 
i t  was much easier to determine a mismatch between the scene
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description ( i .e . ,  internal context) and the stimulus than to determine 
a match between the two. And, subjects in the context-absent condi­
tion reported that i t  was easier to identify a match ( i.e .,  correspon­
dence) than a mismatch.
Finally, the current proposal is  also consistent with the sugges­
tion by Friedman (in press) and Friedman and Bourne (1976) that the 
unique structural arrangement of information contained within a stimulus 
largely determines the depth and direction of the processing of that 
information. The present argument is  simply that the recognition task 
functions as a stimulus and therefore can play an effective part in de­
termining the processing strategy.
The question thus becomes, "What i s  the effect of adopting a 
particular processing strategy upon the a va ilab il ity  of external con­
textual information as the two jo in t ly  influence recognition accuracy?" 
The results from the present study indicate that the adoption of a top- 
down processing strategy is  fac ilita ted  by the presence of external con­
text, whereas the adoption of a bottom-up approach is  most effective 
when external contextual information is  absent. That accuracy was en­
hanced when contextual information was present and top-down processing 
was used points to the character of such processing . . . contextual 
information is general in nature and top-down processing is  founded 
upon general information. Further, this finding confirms what has 
previously been established (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press; Bieder- 
man, et a l . 1974), that physical context aids in the rapid development 
of a ho l is t ic  characterization of the scene. When context is  absent, 
general information is  for the most part lacking, and the condition 
where the ut il iza t ion  of a top-down strategy is most probable ( i.e .,
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when distractor objects are from d iss im ila r scenes) y ie lds poorer recog­
nition accuracy. The finding that accuracy was better when a bottom- 
up strategy was dominant ( i.e .,  when distractors differed from the tar­
get in appearance only) and external context was absent, when compared 
to the condition where such contextual information was present, re­
quires a s l ig h t ly  more complex explanation.
I f  the processing of information from the scene (array) is  bottom- 
up, examining the detail of individual objects and then the relations 
among objects, etc., then why are the context-present and context-absent 
conditions not equal in their effects upon subject accuracy? The ans­
wer may be three-fold: The presence of external context may result in 
some form of lateral inh ib ition or physical confusion whereby objects 
and other detail surrounding the target interfere with the perceptual 
processing of specif ic  detail from the target, causing subjects in this 
condition to be less accurate. A second p o ss ib i l ity  is  that there may 
simply be fewer objects to process in the context-absent condition such 
that the proportion of a ll available detail processed is  greater in 
th is condition than in the context-present condition, with the result 
that accuracy is best in the former condition. Or, the processing of 
general information made possible by the a va i lab il ity  of contextual 
information in the context-present condition may have interfered with 
the encoding and storage of specific  object detail. This la st  poss i­
b i l i t y  stems from the assumption of the duplex theory that external 
contextual information helps to instantiate a ho l is t ic  internal repre­
sentation of the scene, and that a major function of such a repre­
sentation is  to guide attention and the course of processing to confirm
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expectations consistent with that representation. Subjects may have 
utilized  the detailed object information gathered from the bottom-up 
processing to confirm the expectations generated by the presence of 
contextual information, and once confirmed, the information stored by 
the subject for use in the recognition test was more prototypical than 
specific  in form. For such an interpretation to be acceptable, i t  must 
be conceded that there exists a tendency to store information in it s  
prototypical rather than specific  form whenever a more general or g lo­
bal scene characterization is available (see Friedman, in press), and 
that the presence of contextual information leads necessarily to the 
formulation of an integrated schematic representation of the scene from 
which the context was processed (see Biederman 1980, in press). Accord­
ing to this interpretation, recognition accuracy in the present inves­
tigation would be superior when external contextual information was 
absent and detail gathered via a bottom-up strategy could be encoded 
and remembered without interference in it s  orig inal specific  form.
Poorer accuracy would result when the preferred bottom-up processing 
was interfered with by the a va ilab il ity  of additional irrelevant (re la­
tive to the task) detail, or when interference occurred during encoding 
and storage.
Confidence Ratings
The present investigation also examined subjects' confidence in 
their recognition judgments as i t  varied with manipulations in contextual 
information and the form of the recognition test employed. While no 
specific  a priori hypotheses concerning th is measure had been proposed, 
i t  was expected that subjects would be most confident in their
mrecognition judgments when the recognition task was administered in its  
least d if f ic u lt  format ( i .e . ,  when distractor objects were from scenes 
d iss im ila r  to those in which the target objects were typically located), 
and when the greatest amount of contextual information (both internal 
and external) was available.
The observed pattern of confidence ratings were predominantly 
but not fu lly  consistent with this expectation. Subjects were more 
confident about their responses when the recognition test demanded gener­
al rather than specif ic  information about the scene and targeted objects, 
and they were more confident when internal context was provided i f  i t  
was compatible with the scene or array they subsequently viewed. Un­
expected was the finding that the presence or absence of an external 
context did not d if fe ren t ia lly  affect the confidence that subjects d is ­
played in their recognition judgments.
The finding that confidence was greater when general rather than 
specif ic  information was required may be explained in terms of task 
d if f icu lty ,  sim ila r to the interpretation given the accuracy results 
for this variable. Subjects confronted with attribute d istractors in 
the recognition test were obviously in a more demanding situation than 
subjects required to discriminate the target object from scene or object 
d istractors, and their confidence ratings reflected this difference in 
demand. That subject confidence did not vary substantia lly  between the 
scene distractor and object distractor conditions may point to the in ­
fluence of general information upon a subject 's feeling of confidence.
In both of these conditions, as argued earlier, general information about 
the object targeted and the scenes in which i t  is  normally found is 
required, and top-down information processing (either predominantly or
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equally with bottom-up processing) is most probably evoked. Perhaps 
subjects tend to feel more confident when they are, at least part ia lly ,  
guided in their observation of the visual environment by some set of 
expectations regarding it s  content. I f  so, then this finding seems 
most reasonable.
The finding that subjects were more confident in their recognition 
judgments under the compatible prompt condition than under either the 
neutral or incompatible prompting conditions may most easily  be ex­
plained by looking at where in the course of the present task these 
scene descriptions may have had their greatest impact on the accuracy 
of recognition responses. As discussed earlier, i t  is  most l ike ly  that 
such verbal descriptions are subjected to a wait-and-see strategy by 
the subject, where they are compared to the outcome of perceptually 
processing the stimulus and a judgment is made regarding the compatabil- 
ity of the scene description and the perceived stimulus scene (array).
I f  the description is  determined to be compatible i t  is  employed at 
the time the recognition response is  made, and i f  determined to be in ­
compatible i t  is ignored as best as possible. Subjects were more con­
fident when they fe lt  they had two pieces of information ( i .e .,  the 
scene description and the target object it se l f )  on which to base their 
recognition response than when they fe lt ,  as a result of their own 
comparative and judgmental processes, that they had only a s ingle  piece 
of information (the object it se l f )  on which to base that response.
The fa ilure  to find any s ign if icant  differences in assigned confidence 
ratings when the neutral and incompatible prompting conditions were 
compared, supports the notion that subjects tended to ignore the in ­
compatible scene descriptions ( i.e .,  treat them as though they were
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neutral or nonexistent descriptions) when they were assessing how much 
confidence they were w ill ing  to place in their recognition responses.
That subject confidence did not vary substantially  depending upon 
the presence or absence of external contextual information reinforces 
the suggestion made earlier that employing a mixture of compatible, 
neutral, and incompatible scene descriptions prior to the stimulus 
presentation may have interfered with the ordinary course of v isua lly  
processing information from a scene (array), to the extent that the 
normal influence of external contextual information upon the perception 
of an object was disrupted. I t  is  conceivable that such a disruption 
led subjects to discount the presence or absence of th is type of con­
textual information in assigning confidence to their recognition judg­
ments .
The lack of a Distractor by Prompt interaction using the confidence 
measure, v is -a -v is  the presence of that interaction with the accuracy 
measure, may be interpreted as evidence that regardless of the d i f f i ­
culty level of the recognition test subjects fe lt  more confident and 
secure in their responses when they had information about the context 
of the stimulus, and they knew (judged) that information to be com­
patible. As discussed earlier, accuracy was s ign if ican t ly  better 
when compatible (compared to neutral or incompatible) scene descriptions 
were provided, but only when the d if f icu lty  of the discrimination was 
at a minimum.
Weighted Confidence Scores
Prior to discussing the findings with th is  measure, i t  is  impor­
tant to consider it s  nature. The weighted confidence scores represent
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a combination of subjects' recognition accuracy scores and their ratings 
of confidence associated with the recognition responses. Thus, th is 
measure does not correspond to any overt response given by subjects 
and therefore must be interpreted cautiously. As the score is weighted 
in such a way as to result in higher values when a high confidence rat­
ing is  paired with an accurate recognition response and the lowest 
values result when a high confidence rating has been assigned to an in ­
accurate recognition judgment, one interpretation of these scores is 
that they represent the ab i l ity  of subjects to appropriately or accur­
ately place their confidence. I t  is  in this sense that the weighted 
confidence scores were employed in the present study and for this d is ­
cussion. The synthesis of accuracy and confidence measures was used to 
determine i f  the discrepancy between the pattern of findings for these 
two measures studied in iso lation could be better understood, and to 
discover i f  an integrated measure might reveal the anticipated external 
context by distractor type interaction indicated by the accuracy data.
The presence and compatabi1ity  of a pre-stimulus verbal scene 
description interacted with the type of d istractor objects employed in 
the recognition test in their effects upon subject accuracy in that 
test. However, subject confidence did not reveal this interaction; 
both the presence and compatability of a pre-stimulus scene description 
and the type of distractors used in the test s ign if ican t ly  affected 
subject confidence, but their effects were apparently independent.
When this interaction was examined using weighted confidence scores 
i t  fa iled to reach significance. Further, these scores were not d if fe r ­
entia lly  influenced by the three prompting conditions. That subjects
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were no better or worse at judging their recognition performance when 
the effects of the three types of verbal scene descriptions were com­
pared may be interpreted by proposing that only a knowledge of task 
d if f icu lty  is  effective in allowing subjects to accurately judge their 
recognition responses as correct; information concerning the nature 
of the scene to be viewed may be beneficial (or detrimental, i f  incom­
patible) to the recognition response and may influence how much confi­
dence the subject places in that response, but i t  does not provide the 
subject with a good basis for appropriately placing confidence. One 
explanation for this finding is that th is "extra" information about 
the nature (meaning) of the scene lu lled  the subjects into a fa lse sense 
of security about the accuracy of their recognition judgments.
Such an interpretation is supported by the finding that scores 
on this measure were substantia lly  higher when the form of the recogni­
tion test included distractor objects that were from d iss im ila r scenes 
than when the response alternatives were objects from sim ila r scenes 
but different in identity, or the same objects but varied in appearance. 
When subjects fe lt  they were faced with a d if f ic u lt  discrimination in 
the recognition test, they were least able to accurately judge their 
recognition responses. As the d if f ic u lty  lessened, they became in­
creasingly more proficient in judging these responses.
As presented in the Results, weighted confidence scores also 
varied d iffe ren t ia lly  and s ign if ican t ly  as a result of the interaction 
between the presence or absence of external context and the type of 
distractor objects employed in the recognition task. That subjects were 
more capable of accurately assigning confidence ratings to their 
response when external contextual information was present and the
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distractors were objects from d iss im ila r  scenes, and were also more ac­
curate when context was absent and the d istractors differed from the 
target object in appearance only, suggests that the demand for object 
detail when processing from the bottom up, and the demand for general 
information about the object when scene information is being processed 
from the top down may create an ideal circumstance for subjects to be 
able to judge the accuracy of their own responses. When the demand is 
for general information about the scene and only an array of objects 
is available, subjects must struggle with the decision as to which pro­
cessing strategy is most l ike ly  to be profitable, and that struggle 
inh ib its an accurate assessment of performance. Likewise, when specific  
detail about pictured objects is  required by the task at hand and 
additional irrelevant detail is  presented ( i.e .,  context-present, 
attribute-d istractor condition), a sim ilar struggle may ensue and 
s im ila rly  place the subject in the worst position possible for being 
able to accurately judge his or her own performance.
The interpretations given findings with the weighted confidence 
scores assume that a subject 's awareness of his or her accuracy on the 
task employed in the present study is actually reflected in their 
assignment of confidence ratings to the responses given in that task. 
Further, i t  is  necessary to point out that this measure is  completely 
dependent upon the accuracy and confidence measures, with it s  unique­
ness due to the particular combination of these measures. In conse­
quence, the finding that certain variable manipulations s ign if ican t ly  
affected th is  measure when they had sim ila r effects upon accuracy and 
confidence considered apart, may be expected on the basis of this
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dependent relationship. The potential value of this measure appears to 
l ie  in it s  ab i l ity  to offer additional information concerning the s itua ­
tion which arises when the anticipated consistency between the two p r i ­
mary measures is  not found. I t  may or may not be a more sensitive 
measure of the effects of variable manipulations than the two measures 
associated with overt responses.
Summary and Implications
It  is  possible to summarize the findings of the present investiga­
tion by considering the influences of the two types of information 
available in a p ictorial representation of real world scenes and of 
the demands imposed on the subject by the particular task employed to 
study the perception of these representations.
It  may be inferred from the duplex theory of picture perception 
that when pictures of scenes and objects are viewed for a very brief 
period of time, more general than specific  information is  processed 
from these pictures. Object recognition performance in the present 
study reflects the differential a va ilab il ity  of these two kinds of 
information, as both accuracy and confidence were greatest under condi­
tions where general, as opposed to specif ic  or detailed, information 
about the object and scene tested was required to discriminate the 
targeted object from the alternatives. With increased viewing time 
( i.e .,  longer stimulus exposures), the duplex theory suggests that the 
difference in the a va ilab il ity  of general and specif ic  object infor- 
i mation would become less pronounced, eventually reducing to zero as 
the processing of both general and specific  information reached an 
asymptote. While the present study did not employ extended exposure
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times, i t  can be predicted that the increase in viewing time would re­
su lt  in the absence of accuracy and confidence differences for the 
scene and attribute d istractor conditions studied here.
The duplex theory also postulates that one source of general in fo r­
mation about a pictured scene i s  in the form of a memorial network, 
organized on the basis of past experiences that the observer has had 
with s im ilar scenes, which fac il ita te s  the recognition of objects em­
bedded in that scene. This fa c i l ita t ion  may occur at two places during 
the recognition task, either during the processing and encoding of the 
object and/or at the time the recognition response is  made. In the 
current study, an attempt was made to activate th is  memory network by 
providing subjects with a verbal description of a scene (e.g., "KITCHEN 
SCENE"). I t  was found that such verbal prompting did in fact help 
in the recognition of objects, but apparently th is influence was 
limited to the time the response was given. I t  was suggested that 
the fa ilure  of the verbal scene descriptions to influence the course 
of perceptual processing in the present study was due to the employment 
of incompatible and neutral, as well as compatible scene descriptions. 
Because of th is, subjects were induced to adopt a wait-and-see strategy 
regarding the use of these scene descriptions until such time as they 
could make a judgment regarding their compatabi1i t y . That judgment 
required that the stimulus scene or array of objects be at least 
part ia lly  processed, and thus the manipulation had l i t t l e  effect upon 
the perception of the objects. A possible test for the perceptual 
effects of this internally based contextual information would be the 
pre-stimulus administration of compatible ( i.e .,  appropriate) scene 
descriptions to one group of subjects, providing a second group of
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subjects with no pre-stimulus information, and then comparing the per­
formance of the two groups on an object recognition test using d istrac- 
tors sim ilar to those in the attribute-d istractor condition of the 
present study. If ,  as the duplex theory proposes, providing the ob­
server with general information prior to his or her exposure to the 
scene fac i l ita te s  the eff ic ient extraction of detailed or specific  ob­
ject information from that scene, then any differences in object recog- 
n izab il ity  between two such groups could reasonably be attributed to 
the d ifferential impact of the presence or absence of internal a priori 
general information upon the perceptual process.
Subjects in the present study were also more confident in their 
recognition responses when they fe lt  they had two (both a scene descrip­
tion and the object i t s e l f )  rather than a s ingle  (just the object) 
piece of information on which to base those responses. That subjects 
were most confident when scene descriptions were compatible with the 
scene (array) they actually viewed, assigning equally low ratings to 
their recognition judgments when the stimulus had been preceded by 
either a neutral or incompatible scene description, is additional 
evidence that a comparative process is  occurring between the informa­
tion provided prior to the stimulus ( i .e . ,  the pre-stimulus prompt) 
and the information gathered directly from the stimulus by the subject.
F inally, the particular format of the task ut il ized  in testing 
object recognizabi1ity  may part ia lly  determine the type of information 
processing strategy engaged in by the subject. Information may be 
processed from a scene (array of objects) in a predominantly bottom-up 
fashion, in a predominantly top-down fashion, or i t  may be processed
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by using a combination of these two approaches. Depending upon the 
amount of specific  object detail required by the recognition task for 
an accurate response to result, the adoption of one of these three 
general processing strategies w ill occur. I t  was proposed that when 
the task demands only general information concerning the object to be 
recognized, a predominantly top-down approach to processing information 
w ill be selected. When the recognition test demands a detailed know­
ledge of the targeted object, a predominantly bottom-up processing 
strategy is adopted, and when the test necessitates the acquisition of 
both general and specific  information for an accurate discrimination, a 
combination of the two information processing approaches is  used. In 
addition, i t  was suggested that each particular processing strategy 
is  either fac ilita ted  or inhibited by the presence of physical context 
in the stimulus scene (array). According to the duplex theory, such 
external contextual information provides the observer with a more gen­
eral than specific  type of information about the pictured scene and 
the objects contained within it. On this basis, a reasonable conclu­
sion is  that the adoption of a predominantly top-down processing 
strategy is fac ilita ted  by the presence of external context, whereas 
the selection of a predominantly bottom-up strategy is fac ilita ted  by 
the absence of such contextual information.
The results from the present study are supportive of this con­
ceptualization; subjects were most accurate in the object recognition 
task when it s  format required general information and external context 
was available, and when it s  format demanded specific  detail and 
external contextual information was absent. However, these results
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reflect a trend rather than s ign if icant differences in performance.
It  was suggested that the fa ilure  of these differences to reach s ig n if i  
cant proportions may have been due to some degree of interference with 
the processing of external context by the presence of scene descrip­
tions which were varied in appropriateness to that context. For this 
reason, a verification of the relationship between information process­
ing strategies and the contextual information available to the observer 
as proposed in the preceding paragraph, should be conducted with verbal 
scene descriptions excluded from the procedure.
Taken as a whole, the findings of this investigation are quite sup­
portive of the tenets of the duplex theory of picture perception. In 
addition, they point to the ever-present role of the experimental task 
as an influence upon subjects' reactions and responses. I t  remains the 
task for future research to assess the nature of contextual informa­
tion, and to explicate the c r it ic a l  elements which contribute to it s  
formulation and activation as a major factor in our perception of p ic­
tures .
APPENDICE
APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS READ TO ALL SUBJECTS
This study is concerned with how people perceive pictures. 
Specifica lly , I am interested in the kinds of information people 
receive when viewing a picture for a very brie f time, and their 
ab il ity  to u t i l ize  that information in an object recognition test.
Basically, the task involves viewing a (an) picture (array of 
objects), presented very brie fly, and then deciding which of four 
objects came from that picture (array). Prior to viewing each picture 
(array of objects), you w ill be required to read a short phrase written 
in this notebook [point]. The phrase may simply be the words "NO 
PHRASE HERE," or i t  may consist of a meaningful description of a p ic­
tured scene. On one-half of the t r ia l s ,  this description w ill be an 
accurate description of the picture (array of objects) that you w ill 
view . . .  on the other half, the description w ill not be accurate.
Of course you w ill have no way of knowing which is  the case until you 
actually see the picture (array). In any case, i t  i s  important that 
you attend to the phrase you read. After you have read the phrase, 
you are to look into th is viewing aperature [point] and stare at the 
"X" on the display screen. When you have located the "X" and are 
looking directly at i t ,  say "READY," and shortly thereafter a (an) 
picture (array of objects) w ill be flashed on the screen. Once the 
picture (array) disappears, decide which one of the four objects 
pictured in the notebook was contained in the picture (array) you saw 
on the screen. Indicate your response on the answer sheet in front of 
you. Also, I am asking you to indicate the amount of confidence you 
feel you can place in each selection you make. You can do this by 
c irc l ing  the appropriate number on that same sheet. Following th is,
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turn the page in the notebook and the phrase corresponding to the next 
picture (array of objects) w ill be v is ib le , and the next tr ia l  will 
begin.
To summarize the steps involved in the task: read the phrase in 
the notebook, fixate the "X" on the display screen and then say "READY" 
[when you look into the viewing aperature I w ill turn the page in the 
notebook with the phrase so that the four objects are v is ib le ],  after 
the picture (array of objects) disappears look to the notebook and se­
lect the object you think was contained in the presentation, indicate 
this selection on the answer sheet, and c irc le  the number that corres­
ponds to the degree of confidence you have in that particular selection
Do you have any questions concerning what you are supposed to do?
OK. There w ill be s ix  practice t r ia l s  followed by th irty  test 
t r ia ls .  At the conclusion of a ll th ir ty - s ix  t r ia l s ,  I w ill explain in 
more depth the nature of the study and inform you of your performance 
on the object recognition test. At that time I w ill also try to answer 
any questions you may have.
APPENDIX B
ANSWER SHEET USED TO RECORD SUBJECTS' RESPONSES
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Answer Sheet Name
A B
C 0
Write the number corresponding to the cell containing the object from the display 
on the blank, to the left of the trial number.
0 1 2 3 A
not at all extremely
confident . . . confident
Circle the number chat corresponds to the amount of confidence 
you place in your selection.
PI. 0 1 2 3 A 13. 0 1 2 3 A
P2. 0 1 2 3 A 1A. 0 1 2 3 A
P3. 0 1 2 3 A 15. 0 1 2 3 A
PA. 0 1 2 3 A 16. 0 1 2 3 A
P5. 0 1 2 3 A 17. _ 0 1 2 3 A
P6. 0 1 2 3 A 18. 0 1 2 3 A
1. 0 1 2 3 A 19. 0 1 2 3 A
2. 0 1 2 3 A 20. 0 1 2 3 A
3. 0 1 2 3 A 21. 0 1 2 3 A
A. 0 1 2 3 A 22. 0 1 2 3 A
5. 0 1 2 3 A 23. 0 1 2 3 A
6. 0 1 2 3 A 2A. 0 1 2 3 A
7. 0 1 2 3 A 25. 0 1 2 3 A
8. 0 1 2 3 A 26. 0 1 2 3 A
9. _ 0 1 2 3 A 27. 0 1 2 3 A
10. 0 1 2 3 A 28. 0 1 2 3 A
11. _ 0 1 2 3 A 29. 0 1 2 3 A
12. 0 1 2 3 A 30. 0 1 2 3 A
APPENDIX C
SUMMARY TABLES FOR POST HOC ANOVA'S REPORTED IN TEXT
129
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F
Context (C) 1 .34 .34 .09
Distractor (D) 1 315.06 315.06 86.^7***
C X D 1 16.67 16.67 4.56*
Error (between) 44 160.70 3.65 -
Prompt (P) 2 24.67 12.33 6.36**
C X P 2 1.72 .96 .44
D X P 2 30.17 15.08 7.78***
C X D X P 2 3.56 1.78 .92
Error (within) 88 170.56 1.94 -
Total 143 723.44
a - Object condition excluded from Distractor factor in analysis 
*p < .05
**p < .01
* * * p  < .001
Table 7
Context by D istractor3 by Prompt ANOVA Summary: 
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Table 8
Context by D istractor3 by Prompt ANOVA Summary: 
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F
Context (C) 1 1.36 1.36 .31
Distractor (D) 1 144.00 144.00 32.83***
C X D 1 5.44 5.44 1.24
Error (between) 44 192.94 4.38 -
Prompt (P) 2 40.62 20.31 10.42***
C X P 2 8.60 4.30 2.20
D X P 2 16.62 8.31 4.26*
C X D X P 2 .60 .30 .15
Error (within) 88 171.56 1.95 -
Total 143 581.75
a - Attribute condition excluded from Distractor factor in analysis
*p < .05
* * * p  < .001
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Table 9
Context by Distractor by Prompt3 ANOVA Summary: 
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares F
Context (C) 1 .00 .00 -
Distractor (D) 2 247.72 123.86 40.67***
C X D 2 15.17 7.58 2.49
Error (between) 66 201.00 3.04 -
Prompt (P) 1 21.78 21.78 10.63**
C X P 1 2.78 2.78 1.36
D X P 2 29.56 14.78 7.22**
C X D X P 2 2.72 1.36 .66
Error (within) 66 135.17 2.05 -
Total 143 655.89
a - Neutral condition excluded from Prompt factor in analysis
**p < .01 
***p  < .001
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Table  10
Means for Each Subject Used in Analysis Reported in Text
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